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LYNDON JOHNSON, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PARTY
REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTH
Adam L. Warber, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1996
Lyndon Johnson's decision to place the power of the presidency
behind a drive for civil rights of African Americans initiated momentum
which by 1994 resulted in a substantial party realignment in the South.
First, history; Johnson's personal experience as a Southerner; his
knowledge of the political system; his political power, and his
political judgement were important elements in making this decision.
Secondly,

Johnson's considerations in striving for civil rights

legislation included:

(a) consideration of political difficulties and

strategies in framing and in passage of the legislation, (b) his break
with Southern Democratic colleagues on civil rights, (c) the pressures
which might ensue from Northern liberals if he did not support the
civil rights legislation, and (d) support he would lose in the Congress
on other legislation if he pressed hard for civil rights legislation.
Third, while concerned about re-election and electoral support in the
South, Johnson ignored the possibility of party realignment in the
South.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

LYNDON JOHNSON AND CIVIL RIGHTS

Statement of the Pr.oblem
Since the founding of this nation, the American South has been
unable to shed the "stain" on its political heritage regarding civil
rights for African Americans.

Northern resentment of Southern race

relations grew out of the South s insistence on the use of black
I

slavery for its economic system of plantations. This economic division
of an industrial North vs. an agricultural South also politically
divided the two regions.

The result was a Northern call for the eman

cipation of slaves while Southern States rallied around the issue of
states' rights as the method to protect their economic system.

This

led to Southern secession and the Civil War which centered on the
political issue of Federal authority vs. State sovereignty.
Following the War, the South was denied participation in drafting
Reconstruction policies to reunite the North and South. The "Radical
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Republicans in Congress forced the South to accept such provisions in
order re-enter the Union as a State.

In addition, the Thirteenth,

Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Constitutional Amendments were added to
promote black equality.
Following the Civil War and_ Reconstruction, the South over
whelmingly attached itself to the Democratic party.
1

This began the

2

rise of the "Solid" Democratic South in American politics.

Southern

politics during this period was marked by a continued opposition to
black civil rights along with a strong support for States' rights. The
Supreme Court's landmark civil rights cases of Plessy v. Ferguson
(1896) and Brown v. Board of Education (1954 and 1955) resulted in
further Southern attempts to utilize forms of discrimination, referred
to as "Jim Crow" laws, to slow the implementation of laws promoting
black rights.

In Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949), V.O.

Key, Jr. argued that the role of blacks in Southern society was at the
heart of shaping Southern politics. Specifically, Key believed that it
was those

white Southerners

who resided

in areas

which

were

predominately black, who brought the racial factor into Southern
politics. These whites wanted to continue to hold political power over
blacks whom they regarded as being inferior to the white race. Thus,
the South would experience the growth of white supremacy (Key, Jr.,
1949, 5).
It was not until approximately one hundred years following the
Civil War that the most significant civil rights policies were
developed by the Lyndon Johnson Administration (1963-1968). This was
the first time since the Civil War that a president committed his
Administration to black civil rights.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

demonstrated to the States that the Federal government could effect
ively engage in the promotion of civil rights (Carmines and Stimson,
1989, 43-4).

When this proposed Act was presented before Congress,

approximately ninety percent of Southern Democrats serving voted
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against the bill.

The reason for this was many Southern Democrats

became outraged at the extent of civil rights legislation that the
Democratic party was endorsing.

They began to feel that Lyndon

Johnson, the first Southern president since Reconstruction, had "be
trayed" the South (Black and Black, 1992, 149).

Johnson, however, re

sisted Southern pressure to ease up on promoting further civil rights
legislation. If the South was angry at the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, it was infuriated with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 since
its provisions were aimed mainly at Southern States.

In those States,

the Federal government became directly involved in increasing the num
ber of registered voters among blacks.

A major impact of the Voting

Rights Act of 1965 was it politically empowered blacks.

This posed a

threat to the already established Southern political tradition since
this could lead to large numbers of blacks being elected to various
governmental offices (Bass and Devries, 1976, 11-12).

Since African

Americans viewed the Democratic party as the stronger party on civil
rights, they would be much more supportive of the Democrats in contrast
to the Republicans.
The Civil Rights Act of 1968 brought closure to Johnson's civil
rights policies and mainly focused on racial housing rights.

At this

time, the political failure of Johnson's presidency was becoming
apparent.

The war in Vietnam was critical but he lost support in the

South in reaction to his civil rights position.
The major political problem for Johnson's civil rights policies
was they led to a significant decline in the political support that
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Johnson needed from Southern Democrats.

This occurred during the

1960's when many white, Southern, liberal Democrats became "alienated"
within their party and further identified with the Republican party
(Woodward, 1974, 208-9).
Before progressing further, the term "South" used throughout the
study will refer to both the Deep South and the Peripheral South.

The

Deep South consists of ". . . Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina.

The six states of the Peripheral South--Arkansas,

Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia--share memories
of fellow membership in the Confederate States of America, but they are
less distinctively southern" (Matthews and Prothro, 1966, 169).

A

common thread shared by the Deep and Peripheral South is their record
on race relations.
Hypothesis
Lyndon Johnson's decision to place the power of the presidency
behind a drive for civil rights of African Americans initiated momentum
which by 1994 resulted in a substantial party realignment in the South.
1.

History, Johnson's personal experience as a Southerner, his

knowledge of the political system, his political power, and his
political judgement were important elements in making this decision.
2.

Johnson's considerations in striving for civil rights

legislation included:

(a) consideration of political difficulties and

strategies in framing and in passage of the legislation, (b) his break
with Southern Democratic colleagues on civil rights, (c) the pressures
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which might ensue from Northern liberals if he did not support the
civil rights legislation, and (d) support he would lose in the Congress
on other legislation if he pressed hard for civil rights legislation.
3.

While concerned about re-election and electoral support in

the South, Johnson ignored the possibility of party realignment in the
South.
Research Methods
The design for this thesis utilizes a traditional approach to
analyzing the Johnson Administration and civil rights and incorporates
primary and secondary source material.

It not only centers on the

Johnson Administration but focuses on viewpoints from various Southern
Democrats who either served in Congress during the 1960's or held
political office in their respective states.

The second chapter makes

use of the political writings of John C. Calhoun regarding his states'
rights views.

One government document which has been extensively used

is Congressional Record which provides congressional debates on various
civil rights legislation and presents arguments made by Southern
Democrats opposed to Johnson's racial policies.

The study also uti

lizes public papers, an autobiography, and biographies of Lyndon
Johnson; writings of members in his Administration; as well as certain
Southern Democrats.

Finally, several scholarly books and journal

articles on the civil rights movement in the 1960's and on Southern
politics have been referred to in order to add depth to the thesis.
The amount of qualitative literature discussing the nature of
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Southern Democratic opposition to Johnson's civil rights legislation is
small.

This thesis attempts to contribute to the qualitative liter

ature by focusing on the overlooked question as to why Johnson
committed his Administration to pursuing civil rights despite knowing
at the

outset the

political damage

Administration and the Democratic party?

that would

occur to

his

Secondly, it will probe the

question as to why Southern Democrats were still adamant to hold on to
their Southern heritage regarding civil rights policies approximately
hundred years following the Civil War?

Furthermore, this study is

important since it attempts to "dig" beneath the debris of the Vietnam
war during the 1960's.

Presidential scholars attribute much of the

failure of the Johnson Administration to Johnson's Vietnam policies.
However, more research on the Johnson presidency needs to emphasize
other policies which directly affected that Administration.
civil rights policies should not be taken lightly.

Johnson's

In the end, they

were significantly destructive to the Democrats and Lyndon Johnson.
The succeeding chapter begins by briefly tracing the South's support of
states' rights and the issue of federalism with respect to civil rights
for

African

Americans

Administration.

by

beginning

with

the

Andrew

Jackson

CHAPTER II

FEDERALISM AND THE SOUTHERN STATES
On 13 April 1830, President Andrew Jackson along with members of
Congress attended a birthday party to honor the political contributions
of the late Thomas Jefferson.

Those who were responsible for organ

izing the party aimed to better ally themselves with the Democratic
party.

Ironically, the majority of guests who attended were strong

advocates of States' rights which ran counter to Jackson's view of a
strong Federal union (Ellis, 1987, 48).

The climax of the evening

occurred when Jackson and his Vice President, John C. Calhoun, both
toasted in memory of Jefferson. In his toast, Jackson declared ". . .
our Federal Union:

It must be preserved."

responded ". . . the Union:

Calhoun, a Southerner,

next to our Liberty the most dear:

may

we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights
of the States, and distributing equally the benefit and burthen [sic.]"
(Benton, 1903, 147). This support for states' rights opened a fault
line in the political relationship between Jackson and Calhoun.
Calhoun increasingly believed --Southern States had begun to become
alienated from the Federal government as well as from the rest of the
country which he continually refers to as the· "majority" in American
politics.

Therefore, Calhoun devoted a considerable amount of his

political career ensuring that a better equilibrium concerning the
exercise of political power between the Southern States (the minority)
7
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and the rest of the United States existed.
Calhoun argued in his writings that political power in the
American constitutional system rested ultimately in the States.
Specifically, the States not the citizens were the creators of both the
Constitution and the Federal government.
The Role of the States in the American
Constitutional System
The major catalyst responsible for causing Calhoun to support the
idea of States' rights occurred in response to Congress' passage of
what became known as the Tariff of Abominations in 1828. The Tariff of
1828 raised taxes on manufactured goods except for wool products
developed in the textile industry. The South was predominately opposed
since the- tariff tended to favor the North in which the textile
industry prevailed (Castel and Gibson, 1975, 38-9).

Since this tariff

did not specifically benefit States in all regions of the country,
Calhoun considered it to be unconstitutional.

It should be noted that

Calhoun did not dispute the Congress levying a tariff for the purpose
of raising taxes.

However, Calhoun believed it was unconstitutional

for one region of the country to be directly taxed in order to support
the rest of the nation (Niven, 1988, 158).

In a letter to Duff Green

on 1 July 1828,. Calhoun referred to the tariff question by writing "in
its tendency, I consider it, by far the most dangerous question that
has ever sprung up under our system; and mainly because its operation
is so unequal among the parts" (Hemphill and Wilson, 1977, 392).
In addition to believing that the tariff was unconstitutional,
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Calhoun advocated that it resulted in the impoverishment of many
Southern planters.

In response to this, Calhoun explained in a letter

to Samuel D. Ingham of New Hope, Pennsylvania on 23 July 1828 that a
majority of the people in the South felt a sense of separation from the
rest of the country since the tariff was having its greatest impact on
the South. However, at this time, Calhoun was reassured that the South
was politically committed to the American Federal system (Hemphill and
Wilson, 1977, 402).
After this incident, however, Calhoun attempted to keep his
states' rights view from the public as much as possible. This occurred
since Calhoun was interested in challenging Jackson in the presidential
election of 1832.

As time went on, Southern States, especially

Calhoun's home state of South Carolina, pressured Calhoun to take a
public stand on the issue.
In 1831, Calhoun confronted the greatest political problem of his
career.

That is, should he seek the office of the presidency in 1832

in order to oust Andrew Jackson or should he publicly embrace and
pursue his ideas concerning States' rights?

Many South Carolinians

believed the "plundering" of the South by the Federal government needed
immediate attention and pressured Calhoun to carry out Southern plans
for nullification. Nullification was a concept whereby Southern States
believed they could declare certain laws unconstitutional and there
fore, not have to abide by them.

Calhoun's peers also argued that he

lacked the necessary political support to become president (Peterson,
1987, 189).

On 26 July 1831, Calhoun issued his Fort Hill Address
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whereby he publicly announced his decision to vigorously support state
interposition (nullification).
the Tariff of
South.

1828

In this speech, Calhoun explained that

caused a harmful division between the North and

This division not only occurred in these regions, but also in

Congress. Therefore, Calhoun argued that nullification should be a le
gitimate power to provide Southern States, with a "check" on Northern
States concerning congressional legislation (Peterson,
In his

1987

book, entitled The Great Triumvirate:

1987, 192).

Webster, Clay

and Calhoun, Merrill D. Peterson provides additional reasons as to why
Calhoun decided to not seek the presidential office but rather pursue
nullification policies. Peterson agrees that Calhoun lacked the needed
support to run for the presidency. Peterson supports this argument by
explaining that because of Calhoun's views on states' rights and his
increased political dissent over Jacksonian policies, he politically
isolated himself from the party of Andrew Jackson.

Also, Calhoun

realized that the issue of nullification could potentially grow into a
strong political movement which might completely destroy the Union
(Peterson,

1987, 193).

In a letter in May of

1832

to Richard K.

Cralle, newspaper editor of Richmond, Calhoun wrote that he wanted to
". . . make it the criterion of patriotism not to take office under the
Gen[era]l Gov[ernrnen]t till the Constitution be restored; and the South
liberated from her burdens" (Wilson,

1978, 584).

The question that arises is how did Calhoun reason that state
interposition was constitutionally valid? In order to deal with this
question, Calhoun's political and theoretical views on his "concurrent
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majority" theory and state interposition need to be explored.

The

significance of Calhoun's Southern view is that in the 1960's during
the Lyndon Johnson Administration, the issue of states' rights and
federalism were still being addressed by the South in response to the
most significant civil rights legislation passed since Reconstruction.
In a letter to Governor James Hamilton, Jr. of South Carolina on
28 August 1832, Calhoun defended his states' right platform by arguing
that the Constitution was a document created by the States rather than
by individuals. Calhoun pointed out that the constitutional debates as
well as the Constitution's ratification were carried out by each State.
Calhoun stated ". .

the Union, of which the Constitution is the

bond, is a union of States, and not of individuals" (Cralle, 1968b,
147-48).

This then leads to the constitutional debate as to what is

meant by the phrase "We the People" which begins the Preamble to the
Constitution.

Calhoun argued that States not individuals hold sover

eign power to govern.

When preparing his draft on federalism for a

speech before the South Carolina General Assembly, Calhoun wrote that
the States, not the general population, were responsible for the
creation of the Constitution.

Calhoun explained, "if there by any

historical fact certain, it is that the Constitution is the act of the
States, as distinct and separate. . . and not that of the American peo
ple, as a single community" (Wilson, 1978, 495).

Calhoun continued by

arguing that
. . we have conclusive proof in the 7th and last Article of
the Constitution, which provides that the ratification of the
convention[s] of 9 States shall be sufficient for the establish
[men]t of this Constitution between the States, so ratifying
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the same, clearly indicating that "people" in the preamble [sic.]
meant the people of the several States, considered as separate
Com[munit]ies (Wilson, 1978, 497).
In order for the people to be linked to the Federal government,
citizens had to rely on their respective State's decision whether to
ratify the Constitution or not. Since the States were responsible for
putting their citizens under the control of the Federal government,
Calhoun stated, ". . . there is no direct and immediate connection
between the individual citizens of a State and the General Government.
The relation between them is through the State. The Union is a union
of States as communities, and not a union of individuals" (Cralle,
1968b, 148-49).
Calhoun's weakness in his argument occurred when he failed to
address the issue of public support for the Constitution.
without the backing of its citizens,

That is,

the States would have had
Certainly, the political

difficulties in the ratification process.

fate of State governmental officials were held in the hands of their
citizenry.
Therefore, according to Calhoun, when a constitutional dispute
concerning the exercise of power between the States and Federal
government occurs, the Federal government cannot inflict its consensus
on a State (Cralle, 1968b, 152).
Calhoun

advocated

that

in

In order to support his argument,

reality,

the

United

States

is

a

"confederation" under the Constitution just as it was under the
Articles of Confederation.

Calhoun pointed out that most Americans

erroneously perceived the Federal government as deriving its ultimate
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authority from the Constitution rather than from the States.

The

Articles of Confederation were developed by a confederation of
individuals from the States while the United States Constitution was
implemented by the States themselves (Cralle, 1968b, 158-59). Because
of this, Calhoun argued that all States were equal in both controlling
policies passed by the Federal government as well as effectively
opposing their implementation.

This, therefore, leads to Calhoun's

doctrine of the "concurrent majority" in politics.
The "Concurrent Majority" Theory
Calhoun's idea of a "concurrent majority" was to promote unity in
society by protecting the political rights of the minorities by
allowing their grievances to be fully represented by government.
Calhoun argued that in a "concurrent majority" system, "

. . instead

of faction, strife, and struggle for party ascendency, there would
be
'
patriotism, nationality, harmony, and a struggle only for supremacy in
promoting the common good of the whole" (Calhoun, 1851, 48-9).
William W. Freehling wrote in his 1990 article entitled The
Disunion:

Road to

Secessionists at 1776-1854, that "a concurrent majority of

all was by definition a disinterested government, continually possessing every minority's consent" (Freehling, 1990, 258).

One of the

unique qualities of the United States Constitution was the view of the
minority would be protected. Calhoun believed the Constitution and the
notion of "separation of powers" would fail in providing an equal bal
ance between majority and minority rights. Instead, the majority would
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continue to allow its political views to overshadow those of the minor
ity. Calhoun's reason was that the majority were the ones who elect
officials to the Federal government, who in turn appoint Federal judges
who reflect the viewpoints of the majority. These judges would inter
pret the meaning of the Constitution in a manner which would benefit
the majority but would prevent minority views from having an impact on
the political system (Freehling, 1965, 27).
Calhoun was relating his idea of the "concurrent majority" to the
Southern States who were the minority in the Federal Union concerning
economic issues as well as because of their traditional support of
slavery.

Because they were in the minority, Southern States strongly

opposed Federal legislation directly imposed on them (Spain, 1968, 12930). This makes reference to the issue of state interposition which
will be discussed later in the chapter.
It should be noted that within the framework of "concurrent
majority,"

all groups (States) involved in a political system would

have the right to veto any Federal law. Therefore, laws are defined as
those supported by all groups which follow the idea of "concurrent
majority." Although the possibility exists that a concurrent majority
system could end in anarchy, Calhoun argued the benefits would outweigh
the negative consequences.

Instead, he believed it would lead to

"creative compromises" (Freehling, 1965, 27). If the Constitution was
created in the hopes of providing stability within a Union, then how
could a system following the theoretical ideas behind the "concurrent
majority" provide a more unified nation'?

Calhoun argued there were
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indeed several benefits for a union under his idea of a "concurrent
majority" system.
In his work entitled A Disguisition of Government, Calhoun
differentiated between the benefits of a concurrent majority system and
the negative consequences of a numerical majority. The term "numerical
majority" simply refers to a system whereby the majority rule society.
In the case of a concurrent majority, there is a sense of unity among
all groups or interests.

In contrast, division occurs more readily

within a numerical majority system since major struggles occur between
the groups involved regarding the right to control the central
government (Cralle, 1968b, 47).

Calhoun suggested that a system of

concurrent majorities would not result in the dissolution of a union
for two specific reasons.

First, each group (State) would make sure

that the Union was preserved.

If there was a crisis which posed an

immediate threat to a union, all of the groups (States) would work to
ensure that necessary legislation was passed to remedy the situation.
The second reason was each group (State) would be composed of the most
competent governmental officials who would be entrusted to engage in
compromises with other groups (States).

These statesmen would vigor

ously seek to preserve the political system (Freehling, 1965, 27-8).
In his 1965 article entitled "Spoilsmen and Interests in the Thought
and Career of John C. Calhoun," William W. Freehling argued that
Calhoun's "concurrent majority" theory failed to end political corrup
tion among competing politicians. Freehling pointed out that the con
current majority theory ". . . assumes that the interests control their
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politicians. The theory of spoilsmen rests on the premise that dema
gogues control their constituents. The concurrent majority, in curing
the disease of the interests, will not affect the intrigues of the
demagogues" (Freehling, 1965, 34).

That is, one cannot successfully

curb a politician's desire for political power.

Once an individual

holds political office, the temptation exists for an abuse of powers.
State Interposition, Secession, and the Civil War
If the United States were to adopt and implement the basic notion
of the "concurrent majority," the States need to. be granted with
specific political powers to ensure that each State exercises equal
authority. According to Calhoun, States would be given the power of
nullification, also referred to as state interposition.

On 26 July

1831, Calhoun wrote to Frederick W. Symmes, editor of Pendleton, South
Carolina's Messenger concerning his support of state interposition as
a major instrument utilized by States that adhered to the idea of the
"concurrent majority." Calhoun stated,
. . should the General Government, and a State come into
conflict, we have a higher remedy; the power which called the
General Government into existence, which gave it all of its au
thority, and can enlarge, contract, or abolish its powers at its
pleasure, may be invoked (Wilson, 1978, 421).
In a general sense, interposition is defined as " . . . throwing the
shield of protection between the citizens of a.State and the encroach
ments of the Government. . . " (Cralle, 1968b, 160). Specifically, the
idea is to allow States to declare laws passed by Congress as unconsti
tutional.

If certain laws are deemed unconstitutional, the States
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believe they are not bound to obey them {Cralle, 1968b, 159).
In advocating interposition, Calhoun was not suggesting that this
would lead to a rise in Southern supremacy.

Instead, there needed to

be an equilibrium concerning the exercise of power among States in all
regions of the country. That is, the minority {Southern States) should
be well represented by having their views heard and considered just
like the majority {Northern States) are {Niven, 1988, 160).

The issue

of state interposition was finally invoked by Southern States on 14
July 1832 in response to Congress' passage of the Tariff of 1832 which
lowered rates set by the Tariff of 1828. Since the South did not favor
the new tariff either because they sti11 were taxed more than the
North, they carried out their nullification threat {Castel and Gibson,
1975, 45). When this crisis occurred, questions of Southern secession
also arose.
Southern advocates of states' rights and state interposition
believed any State could constitutionally secede from the Union. This
could occur if the Supreme Court failed to declare those governmental
acts and legislation which were unconstitutional.

Thus, since they

entered the Union on their own, they could leave at any time when they
believed the Federal government was not adhering to constitutional
principles.

Calhoun believed secession should be used by States as a

last resort.

The prime reason Calhoun favored state interposition to

that of secession was he wanted to safeguard the traditional Southern
"social hierarchy" concerning blacks and whites {Freehling, 1990, 2589). As time progressed, Southern States believed the only alternative
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to preserving their "minority" political views was to secede.
A second reason that the South did not want the Federal
government to interfere with the authority of the States was the South
wanted to protect its economic system. The Southern economic structure
during most of the Nineteenth century until the Civil War was based on
an agricultural system of plantations which relied on black slavery in
stark contrast to Northern industrialization (McPherson, 1992, 26).
During the period from 1815 until the Civil War, the most profitable
economic resource in the United States was Southern cotton.

This era

of "King Cotton" grew in response to the Northern textile industries'
need for larger quantities of cotton following the development of Eli
Whitney's cotton gin in 1793 which further expedited cotton production.
This invention and Northern demand increased the South's dependence on
its system of slavery since cotton production in this region doubled
(McPherson, 1992, 28).
The institution of slavery was one of the major driving forces
which led to conflict between the political authority of the Federal
government and the rights of States. During a speech before the Senate
on 6 February 1837, Calhoun reacted to the issue of the abolition of
slavery in the South.

He argued that abolition would politically

separate the South from the rest of the Union.

Furthermore, it would

socially disrupt peace and stability between blacks and whites in that
region.

Calhoun summarized the overall position of the South by

stating that slavery, "be it good or bad, it has grown up with our
society and institutions, and is so interwoven with them, that to
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destroy it would be to destroy us as a people" (Wilson, 1980, 394-5).
One Supreme

Court

case

regarding slavery

which

received

significant attention from both the North and South prior to the Civil
War was Scott v. Sandford (1857).

This ruling confirmed that the

Constitution did not define a Negro as a "citizen."

That is, States

could provide blacks with State citizenship but could not bestow the
rights of United States citizenship to blacks [Scott v. Sandford,
(1857), 19 Howard 393]. This case reinforced Southern willingness to
continue utilizing black slavery.
It was not until several weeks after the election of Abraham
Lincoln to the presidency in 1860, that individual Southern States
began to mobilize themselves in an effort to secede from the Union.
Each Southern State instructed its voters to select delegates which
would form a convention to decide the question of secession.

South

Carolina was the first state to vote in favor of secession on 20
December 1860.

This was the only Southern State to have a unanimous

vote among its delegates in support of secession (McPherson, 1992,
131). Eventually, the rest of the South followed suit and on 14 April
1861, the Southern Confederacy officially initiated the Civil War by
firing the first shots on Fort Sumter (McPherson, 1992, 149).
Unlike the South, Abraham Lincoln advocated that after the
creation of the Constitution, each State gave up certain political
rights which they bestowed upon the Federal government.

Because of

this, States had no legal basis to leave the Union (Stampp, 1965, 25).
In his First Inaugural Address on 4 March 1861, Lincoln stated "
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no State, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union,
. and that acts of violence, within any State or States, against
the authority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolu
tionary, according to circumstances" (Basler, 1953, 265). This led the
Lincoln Administration to focus sharply on the preservation of the
United States. Even so, questions surrounding black equality continued
to surface once Lincoln began to devise a plan for Reconstruction fol
lowing the Civil War.
Throughout the Civil War, the question of ending slavery and
promoting black civil rights was an issue to which the Lincoln
Administration needed a prompt response.
apprehensive at emancipating Negro slaves.

Lincoln,

himself,

was

One reason was he believed

that if slaves were free, the threat existed that Northern industrial
cities would be flooded with ex-slaves seeking employment.

Secondly

and most importantly in the eyes of the Lincoln Administration was the
preservation of the Union.

Therefore, Lincoln reasoned that a hasty

decision to emancipate might cause Southern States to further distance
themselves from returning to the Union (Meier, 1976, 156).

Once the

War was over and emancipation had taken place, future presidents were
still left to deal with the problem of the White South.

The South

remained opposed to Federal intervention in racial matters.
Reconstruction and Jim Crow
During the period of Reconstruction (1865-1876), the Democratic
party developed into the dominating political party of the South.
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Specifically, the Democratic party became the party of the whites who
attempted to reassert political; economic; and social control over
Southern Negroes. It also emerged as the major party which opposed and
could significantly obstruct Republican Reconstruction policies (Rae,
1994, 30).

The Republicans, however, reacted by passing the three

Civil War Amendments.
The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified on 6 December 1865, prohibited
slavery in the United States and gave Congress the authority to pass
legislation, if needed, in order to ensure its abolition (United States
Constitution, Amend. XII, sec. 1-2).

Following

passage of this

Amendment, Southern States were left with the decision to ratify it.

j

A majority of them were apprehensive since they claimed the Amendment
significantly increased the power of the Federal government.

They

argued this would lead to further attempts by the Federal government to
enact legislation which would give itself even greater authority
(Foner, 1988, 199).
On 9 July 1868, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
occurred.

The major provision of the Amendment was it provided

citizenship rights for blacks along with the ". . . equal protection of
the laws" (United States Constitution, Amend. XIV, sec. 1). In Section
three of the Amendment, the Republican-controlled Congress also struck
a blow against the South by denouncing the Southern Confederacy.

In

this section, Southerners who were once supporters of the United States
Constitution but then advocated the cause of a "rebellion" such as the
Confederacy during the Civil War were forbidden to hold office at the
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State or Federal level.

The only exception for this stipulation was

Congress could disregard this provision in certain cases by a two
thirds majority vote in each House (United States Constitution, Amend.
XIV,

sec. 3).
One of the problems of the Fourteenth Amendment was its

vagueness.

For example, several members in Congress such as Senator

Charles Sumner of Massachusetts believed the Amendment did not fully
protect black citizenship rights.

Sumner argued the Amendment would

lead to segregation in the South because of its mention of "equal
protection" among the races. Therefore, Sumner became an advocate for
forcing the Southern States to develop integrated schools for blacks
and whites. Sumner also attempted to have Congress pass a Civil Rights
Act which would prevent States from declaring that the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionally legitimized segregation (Stampp, 1965, 139).
Sumner believed the Federal government was needed to ensure black
rights. In a letter to John Bright on 17 August 1866, Sumner wrote

11 •

. . I see small chance of peace & security so long as the freedmen are
denied Equality of Rights" (Palmer, 1990, 376).

In 1875, Congress

passed a Civil Rights Act which called for the government to promote
equality among all races. The problem of this legislation was it did
not address the issue of integrated schools (Stampp, 1965, 140). The
Supreme Court in 1883, however, ruled in several cases referred to as
the Civil Rights Cases that discrimination by individuals rather than
by States was not addressed by the Fourteenth Amendment [Civil Rights
Cases (1883), 109 U.S. 3].
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Members of Congress eventually concluded that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not serve as a final solution to providing black equality
(Franklin, 1994, 82). In response to this, the Fifteenth Amendment was
ratified on 3 February 1870 which provided suffrage for African
Americans (United States Constitution, Amend. XV, sec. 1).

This

Amendment, however, still did not guarantee blacks that their rights
would be protected.
Following the Civil War, Southern States developed the so-called
"black codes" which were attempts to suppress black rights and reassert
white control over that race.
discrimination for blacks.

These codes resulted in continued

For example, in some States, codes were

enacted which prevented blacks from marrying whites (McPherson, 1992,
509).

Various areas in the South also experienced the growth of white

supremacist organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan in 1866, which
opposed Radical Republican Reconstruction policies as well as intimi
dated blacks in an effort to ensure white control over them (Stampp,
1965, 199-200).
The failure of Reconstruction was evident in 1877 when Federal
troops were removed from the South by President Rutherford Hayes.
Although Southern States had been readmitted to the Union prior to this
year, the failure of Reconstruction was a severe blow to the promotion
of civil rights.

Instead, the end of Reconstruction opened the door

for Southern whites to determine for themselves the expediency, if at
all, of the progress of black rights (Stampp, 1965, 186-87).
Following the end of Reconstruction, the South experienced the
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rise of so-called Jim Crow laws which were Southern attempts to promote
further segregation.

For example, many Southern States implemented

devices such as literacy and character tests, poll taxes, as well as
required that potential voters meet a property qualification test
before being registered as voters. Furthermore, a "grandfather" clause
was implemented as a prerequisite in order to vote in Louisiana; North
Carolina; Alabama, and Georgia. This meant that a person was eligible
to vote only if they had family members who were registered voters
before 1867. Since a majority of the black population was not eligible
to vote before this year, the States easily dismissed many unqualified
voters. However, it was not until the Supreme Court's ruling in Plessy
v. Ferguson in 1896, that Jim Crow laws greatly flourished since the
Court's ruling of "separate but equal" accommodations for whites and
blacks was in effect, thus, legitimizing Jim Crow (McPherson, 1992,
608).
In Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court ruled that "separate but equal"
public facilities for whites and blacks were constitutional. The Court
also ruled that it did not have the authority to integrate blacks and
whites within society. The initial case stated that a Louisiana law
which allowed segregation in railroad cars was constitutional [Plessy
v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537].
The period between 1896 and 1954 was marked by a few significant
Supreme Court rulings which eventually were viewed as rather weak in
protecting black rights.

In Guinn v. United States, the Court struck

down an amendment to Oklahoma's Constitution which placed restrictions
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on voter registration. The Supreme Court ruled the amendment violated
the Fifteenth Amendment [Guinn v. United States (1915), 238 U.S. 347].
In 1938, the Court ruled in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada that
Lloyd Gaines' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was
denied the right to attend a law school for whites because he was
black.

The University of Missouri did not provide blacks with a

separate facility for law school studies [Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada (1938), 305 U.S. 337].
Southern white primaries received a severe blow to their
existence in the Smith v. Allwright case of 1944 which stated blacks
could not be denied participation in state primaries [Smith v.
Allwright (1944), 321 U.S. 649]. The issue of property was dwelt with
in the Shelley v. Kraemer case of 1948 which stated that individuals
could draft "covenants" in order to prevent blacks from purchasing
property in their neighborhoods.

The Court ruled that it was a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for States to interfere with the
development and enforcement of such "covenants" [Shelley v. Kraemer
(1948), 334 U.S. 1] .

The Sweatt v. Painter case in 1950 once again

addressed the issue of equal educational facilities for blacks.

The

Court ruled an African American had been unlawfully denied the right to
attend law school since the University of Texas did not provide a
facility for blacks [Sweatt v. Painter

(1950). 339 U.S. 629).

In 1954 and 1955, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases in Oliver
Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas,
et al. that the "separate but equal" doctrine of the Plessy v. Ferguson
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case was no longer valid.

Specifically, separate schools for blacks

were not deemed by the Court as being equal to white schools [Brown v.
Board of Education

(1954), 347 U.S. 483). Theoretically, the ruling

of this case " . . . would be the precedent for declaring unconstitu
tional any state-imposed or enforced segregation" (Sitkoff, 1981, 223). This case gave the Federal judicial system the responsibility to
make sure that local school districts in the South were making neces
sary efforts to effectively end segregation within educational systems.
After the ruling, the South became enraged since it believed the case
was a method for the North to further erode the South's political
ability to govern (Williamson, 1984, 507).
The problem with the Brown v. Board of Education case was the
Court did not set a timetable as to when States were to end segrega
tion. Instead, the Court opted to gradually end segregation in schools
rather than providing an immediate ban [Brown v. Board of Education
(1955), 349 U.S. 294).

One of the reasons for this approach was to

partially appease the approximately eighty percent of Southern whites
who were outraged with the Court's decision. The Court wanted to curb
sudden Southern opposition and anger to the decision which might result
in violence (Sitkoff, 1981, 24).

Even the office of the presidency

took a neutral position in response to the issue of ending Southern
segregation.

Dwight Eisenhower did not strongly support the Brown

decision since he did not want to disrupt the political support he
garnered from Southern whites. Furthermore, Eisenhower advocated that
forcing the South to deal with integration in schools would not be the
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most effective method to end segregation (Sitkoff, 1981, 25).

In his

presidential memoirs, Eisenhower explained his reason for not forcing
integration in educational facilities. He stated that during the pe
riod of the Brown decision, "the recent record of the South seemed to
imply a steady though painfully slow improvement in some areas of race
relations" (Eisenhower, 1965, 151).

As could be expected, the South

strongly opposed the Supreme Court's ruling.
In retaliation, one hundred and one Southern congressmen drafted
a Southern manifesto,

formally referred to as a "Declaration of

Constitutional Principles" on 22 March 1956.

Specifically, these

members of Congress advocated that school desegregation was an issue to
be dealt with by the States rather than by the Federal government
(Sitkoff, 1981, 26).
Despite Southern opposition to civil rights, there was one
significant piece of civil rights legislation passed during the
Eisenhower Administration. Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act of
1957 into law on 9 September 1957 which was the first major civil
rights bill to be passed since Reconstruction.

This legislation

developed the Commission on Civil Rights to prevent voter discrimi
nation.

It also gave authority to the United States' Department of

Justice to enforce voting rights (P.L. 85-315; 71 Stat 634). This Act,
however, was not successful in ending discrimination in the South.
Lyndon Johnson and the Second Period
of Reconstruction
During the beginning of the John Kennedy Administration, the
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issue of civil rights was dormant since Kennedy did not want to disrupt
the political support he held from the South.

Kennedy had advocated

the need for an aggressive civil rights policy during his 1960
presidential campaign. Once in office, Kennedy decided not to pursue
civil rights legislation since there was a strong coalition of
Southerners in Congress who opposed such actions.

Although the

Democrats controlled both Houses of Congress, there was not enough
political strength among them to pass such controversial legislation.
Eventually, Kennedy was forced to strongly encourage Congress to enact
civil rights policies in 1963 in response to increased racial strife
(Weisbrot, 1990, 151).
In a speech before the American public on 11 June 1963, Kennedy
announced his Administration's commitment to racial equality and
declared his intention to call upon Congress to pass a civil rights
bill ending discrimination in public facilities. The significance of
Kennedy's pledge was he wanted the Federal government to have a larger
role in civil rights policy than in previous presidential admini
strations. Kennedy demonstrated this by further stating that he wanted
II

Congress to authorize the Federal Government to participate more

fully in lawsuits designed to end segregation in public education"
(Public Papers of Kennedy, 1964, 469-70). Thus, the States were to be
no longer

the

main political

instruments to

establish

racial

integration. Kennedy's push for such legislation immediately led to a
declining support

of

his Administration

from

Southern

whites.

Furthermore, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) received growing support
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from the South as a viable Republican nominee to challenge Kennedy in
the 1964 presidential election because of his opposition to such a bill
(Brauer, 1977, 298-99).

This was the beginning point whereby a major

political "battle" was to be waged by Southern Democrats in defiance of
civil rights for African Americans.
Following the assassination of John Kennedy on 22 November 1963,
Lyndon Johnson inherited the presidency and was left to deal with his
Southern colleagues on racial issues.

This era in civil rights,

referred to as the "Second Reconstruction" by historians, would prove
to be one was Johnson's greatest challenges as president and would be
partially responsible for his failed presidency.

At the end of his

Administration, Johnson paid the high price of Southern Democratic
support in return for eradicating much of the nation from the "grip" of
Jim Crow.

Thus, to many blacks, Johnson was seen as a modern "emanci

pator" in civil rights while Southern Democrats viewed Johnson as the
ultimate betrayer of the Democratic party and sectional politics.

CHAPTER III
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964--THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S
COMMITMENT TO CIVIL RIGHTS
Introduction
On 1 October 1962, the United States was confronted with its most
serious problem concerning federalism since the Civil War.
date,

On this

Federal marshals gathered at the University of Oxford in

Mississippi to ensure the entry of James Meredith who was black.

The

event led to violence whereby Federal marshals were physically
assaulted by white students as well as by individuals outside of the
college community (Woodward, 1974, 174-5).

It would not be until the

Lyndon Johnson Administration ( 1963-1968) that civil rights would
become a strong White House policy which would sharpen the conflict
with the South concerning Federal v. State authority.

When John F.

Kennedy was assassinated on 22 November 1963, the nation went into a
period of "traumatic shock.
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Lyndon Johnson took advantage of this

dark period in American history by pushing through Congress a
tremendous amount of legislation (Reedy, 1970, 82-3). Johnson realized
he needed to obtain the support from a united Democratic party in order
to successfully pursue his Great Society. Secondly, Johnson attempted
to seek Southern congressional support concerning civil rights since he
feared that if he could not further black equality, he risked losing a
second bid for the presidency in 1968.
30

For example, blacks could
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potentially become frustrated over the Johnson Administration and
resort to racial violence as a means to achieve further equality
(Wicker, 1968, 176). This could potentially weaken Johnson's political
support as well as hurt the Democratic party in future elections.
Therefore, Johnson used the Kennedy assassination as a springboard to
strongly encourage Congress to pass a civil rights bill by declaring it
would be an appropriate tribute to the slain President (Goodwin, 1988,
312).
The most significant civil rights legislation passed during the
Johnson Administration were the 1964 Civil Rights Act; Voting Rights
Act of 1965; and the Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Although the South

argued these were direct attempts to force Federal policies upon their
region, Johnson argued that since Southern states were not taking the
initiative to promote black equality, it was the responsibility of the
Federal government to enforce constitutional rights of citizens.
Johnson's Civil Rights Commitment
In a dramatic speech before the Senate on 4 March 1850, John C.
Calhoun argued that the North was unjustifiably attempting to impose
its oppositional view of slavery on the South.

Calhoun believed the

only method to ensure the preservation of the Union was by providing
Southern States with "simple justice." One of the ways the North could
provide Southern justice was
. to cease the agitation of the slave question, and to
provide for the insertion of a provision in the constitution
[sic.], by an amendment, which will restore to the South, in
substance, the power she possessed of protecting herself, before
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the equilibrium between the sections was destroyed by the action
of this Government (Cralle, 1854, 571-72).
In contrast, Lyndon Johnson wrote in a chapter of his autobiography
entitled "The Struggle for Justice" that in the 1960's it was the
African Americans rather than the South that deserved justice. Shortly
after the Kennedy assassination, Johnson wrote in his memoir "I knew
that, as President and as a man, I would use every ounce of strength I
possessed to gain justice for the black American. . . I recognized that
the moral force of the Presidency is often stronger than the political
force (Johnson, 1971, 157).

In her biography of Johnson, Doris Kearns

contended that Johnson pursued black justice because it was a moral
issue that needed to be confronted. Kearns quoted Johnson as stating
. . . as President I couldn't make people want to integrate their
schools or open their doors to blacks, but I could make them feel
guilty for not doing it and I believed it was my moral responsi
bility to do precisely that--to use the moral suasion [sic.] of
my office to make people feel that segregation was a curse they'd
carry with them to their graves (Kearns, 1976, 306).
Johnson also believed the North was just as guilty as the South for the
spread of black racism and therefore, civil rights was a national
problem.

Johnson asserted that the problem in the North was much

greater to solve than in the South since "all too often the same
Northern whites who were perfectly willing to grant the Negro his
formal rights as a citizen were unwilling or unable to grant the social
acceptance and compassion that would make the formal rights meaningful
(Johnson, 1971, 167).
At the beginning of his Administration, Johnson believed the time
had come to develop strong civil rights legislation because the social
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and political atmosphere in American society had warranted it. Johnson
explained, "the potential strength of public opinion had first been
evident in the march on Washington late in the Summer of 1963.

By the

spring of 1964 this climate of opinion could be felt by every Senator
and Congressman" (Johnson, 1971, 159). Johnson justified his vigorous
attempts to secure civil rights legislation by advocating that despite
his Southern heritage, as President, he represented the best interests
of the nation as a whole (Johnson, 1971, 39).

When Johnson was Senate

Majority Leader during the Eisenhower Administration, he was not as
supportive of civil rights legislation.

In his memoirs, Richard N.

Goodwin wrote that Johnson explained to him that he was more committed
to civil rights as President because as president, his constituency was
the entire nation.
South.

As Senator, Johnson's main constituency was the

Therefore, Johnson believed he had more room to maneuver in a

civil rights agenda since it was not entirely restrained by Southern
politics (Goodwin, 1988, 316).

Johnson also needed to seek presiden

tial support from the Northern liberals who were supportive of an
Administration committed to civil rights.
Johnson believed the power of the presidency provided him the
necessary "springboard" to promote strong civil rights policies.
Johnson admitted that as a former Senate Majority Leader he was not as
concerned about expanding black civil rights. However, Johnson stated,
". . . all that changed when I became President.
and the obligation to do something.
priority.

Then I had the power

Then it did become my personal

Then something could happen" (Kearns, 1976, 232).
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American society also reinforced the need for a presidential
administration committed to such a cause.

For example, civil rights

workers during the 1960 's who went to the South to promote greater
equality for blacks, argued it was the Federal government's sole
responsibility to enforce civil rights policies.
racial violence,

Because of increased

these workers claimed conflicts over federalism

between the Federal and State governments should have no bearing on
civil rights policies.

Instead, they claimed Federal action was

justified because civil rights policies in the 1960's were designed to
protect constitutional rights that were not to be denied (Lawson, 1985,
19-20).

Increasing Federal authority to deal with civil rights was

also supported by Johnson. Johnson argued that the major civil rights
problem
. . was the increasing alienation of the black citizens from
American society. Our representative system was based on the
joint premise that all citizens would be responsible under the
law and that the law would be responsive to the needs of all cit
izens (Johnson, 1971, 160).
There were several important elements that strongly pressed
Congress to pass a civil rights bill in 1964.

First, Johnson called

for the passage of an uncompromised bill. Johnson stated, "it would be
a fight to total victory or total defeat without appeasement or
attrition"

(Johnson,

1971,

158).

Also,

the public had become

increasingly supportive of such legislation during the latter part of
the Kennedy Administration.

The major reason for this was they had

seen through the media, especially television, the harsh treatment of
African Americans by whites opposed to furthering black rights.
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Furthermore, religious organizations increasingly supported the Johnson
Administration's efforts to focus heavily on civil rights policies
(Garrettson III, 1993, 133-4).

Johnson also received support from

leaders of the civil rights movement. On 29 April 1964, Johnson spoke
before an audience of civil rights leaders regarding the pending Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in Congress.

It

was here Johnson summed up his

Administration's commitment to civil rights when he stated:
a hundred years ago Lincoln freed the slaves of their chains, but
he did not free the country of its bigotry. A hundred years ago
Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation, but until education
is unaware of race, until employment is blind to color, emanci
pation will be a proclamation, but it will not be a fact (Public
Papers, 1965, 588).
When the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, the South opposed
the Federal government interfering with their rights to govern as
States.

Johnson, however, did not want the South to have this

perception once the Act was to be enforced. In his television address
before the nation on 2 July 1964 whereby Johnson discussed the Civil
Rights bill that he was about to sign, Johnson explained the Federal
government would enforce the Act if States did not take the initiative
to implement the provisions themselves (Public Papers, 1965, 843).
Despite this, the South was infuriated with complying with this legis
lation which ran counter to traditional, Southern, white politics.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr., chief domestic adviser during the
Johnson Administration, wrote in his memoir that Johnson understood the
Democratic party would politically suffer following the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.

Instead of addressing the potential consequences that

would arise from this problem, Johnson continued to pursue further
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civil rights legislation such as ensuring black voting rights.
Califano stated that shortly after the signing of the Act, Johnson
remarked to Bill Moyers, who served as Special Assistant to the
President, that " . . I think we delivered the South to the Republican
Even so,

Party for your lifetime and mine" (Califano, 1991, 55).

throughout his Administration, Lyndon Johnson continually advocated the
time had come for blacks to achieve full economic, political, and
social equality despite ideological differences that existed within the
Democratic party.
Summary of Critical Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The civil rights legislation which was passed during the Johnson
Administration is considered to be the most significant civil rights
policies to be developed since the Civil War Amendments. Specifically,
it eradicated Jim Crow laws and lawful segregation as discussed in
chapter two.

The initial enactment was the Civil Rights Act of 1964

which resulted in two general, but significant developments.

First,

this legislation demonstrated to the States that the Federal government
could effectively engage in the promotion of civil rights.

Secondly,

the Democrats vowed through actions rather than rhetoric to vigorously
lead the nation in promoting equality between African Americans and
whites (Carmines and Stimson, 1989, 43-4).
The purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided the Federal
government with significant leverage through congressional law to force
the South to end segregation.

For example, the law forced the
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integration of schools. This was necessary since the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education was never effectively upheld
(Miller, 1980, 371). One problem with the Act was it did not effect
ively solve the problem of increasing black voter registration.

De

spite this, the Act did serve as a springboard to further civil rights
legislation which pressed further for the elimination of Southern
segregation.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241) also
greatly increased the authority of the Federal government to aid blacks
in their quest to overcome Southern segregation.

For example, the

Federal government could cease funding of certain programs such as
education if a particular Southern State failed to take the initiative
to comply with the Act's provisions (Scher, 1992, 299).
One of the weaker provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
Title I which attempted to protect black voting rights. Specifically,
it prohibited the use of discriminatory devices such as literacy tests
as a method for registering voters for Federal elections. Instead, it
declared all individuals with a sixth-grade education could register
(United States Statutes at Large, 1965, 241-42).

The major problem

with this Act was it did not provide a strong mechanism to enforce
voter registration among blacks and therefore, was generally deemed as
ineffective. It was not until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (P.L. 89-110) that this flaw would receive serious consideration
(Scher, 1992, 299).
The most significant section of the Act was Title II which
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declared there could be no discrimination in public accommodations. If
an individual believed he/she had been discriminated against, he/she
could sue the business accused of practicing discrimination.

The Act

also gave the Attorney General authority to aid in suing such
accommodations if he/she felt the case had national importance in
relation to the Federal government's attempt to end discrimination
(United States Statutes at Large, 1965, 243-44).

In addition, Title

VII also prevented discrimination in the workplace.

It called for the

creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which
consisted of a board of five individuals who would act as arbiters in
issues where discrimination at places of employment were called into
question. This Commission's actions were held accountable to both the
president and Congress (United States Statutes at Large, 1965, 258).
Implementation of Civil Rights Act of 1964
As Johnson began his first full term as president in 1965, he
appointed Vice President Hubert Humphrey to oversee White House
policies on civil rights.

Humphrey not only headed the newly

President's Council on Equal Opportunity but Johnson also put him in
charge of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
One of the major responsibilities undertaken by Humphrey was to monitor
the implementation of the Civil Rights Act of. 1964.

In September of

1965, approximately eight months after Humphrey was appointed to head
the civil rights policies, plans were underway in the White House to
assign the Attorney General to be responsible for civil rights issues.
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Thus,

Humphrey was removed by Johnson as the Administration's

spokesperson for civil rights.

This reorganization plan also called

for the dismantling of the President's Council on Equal Opportunity and
the President's Cammittee on Equal Employment. A major reason for this
change was Johnson believed Humphrey was too soft on civil rights and
thus, would not effectively handle racial riots which might occur in
American cities (Califano, 1991, 64-6).
The passage of this 1964 Act, however, had negative repercussions
for Johnson and the Democratic party.

When the final versions of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 came before both the House of Representatives
and the Senate, approximately ninety percent of the Southern Democrats
serving in Congress voted against its passage. The reason for this was
many Southern Democrats were outraged at the extent of civil rights
legislation the Democratic party was endorsing. In response, they felt
Lyndon Johnson, the first Southern president since Reconstruction, had
"betrayed" the South (Black and Black, 1992, 149).

Johnson, however,

resisted Southern pressure to ease up on promoting further civil rights
legislation.
Southern Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Although he knew Southern Democrats would overwhelmingly oppose
the proposed civil rights bill in 1964, Johnson needed to hold on to
their overall political support within the Democratic party since many
Southern Democrats supported his Vietnam policies. In return, Southern
Democrats were also aware of the importance of supporting the Johnson
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Administration since many Southern industrial plants, such as Senator
Richard Russell's (D-Ga.) state, received contracts from the Pentagon
to produce defense materials for the Vietnam war.

Because of this,

Southern Democrats were not as vocal in their opposition to the pending
bill as they would become with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Although
they strongly opposed such an issue, they were not quite prepared to
disrupt unity within the Democratic party at this time (Woods, 1995,
329-30). Even so, Johnson planted the destructive seed which would be
a significant factor leading to the collapse of the "Solid" Democratic
South with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Johnson understood that by publicly committing his Administration
to develop and implement strong civil rights legislation for blacks, he
risked losing significant political support from Southern Democrats.
Therefore, during the beginning period of his Administration, Johnson
attempted to develop a cooperative working atmosphere with Republican
Senator Everett Dirksen who served as the Minority Leader in the Senate
in order to win passage of his 1964 civil rights legislation.

The

major reason for this was Johnson needed to win over as many
supporters, especially from moderate Republicans, on civil rights to
prevent a lengthy filibuster from occurring by the Southern Democrats
(Johnson, 1971, 158).

No longer could he completely control politi

cally, his Southern congressional colleagues.
"Sectional" vs. "Regional" Legislation
It appears that during Senate debate on the proposed civil
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right's bill, Richard Russell (D-Ga.) was resigned to the fact that
Southern Democrats had lost their grip on preventing its passage. At
one point during the Senate debate on 17 June 1964, Russell stated "It
seems that all the amendments proposed to the bill are found to be most
excellent and worthy of everything except adoption and approval" ( Con
gressional Record, 1964a, 14200). Although Southern Democrats appeared
to have understood that they no longer had the political "muscle" to
block civil rights legislation, these modern "Calhounites" still de
clared the proposed 1964 Act to be unconstitutional based on funda
mental American political principles.
The major argument made by Southern Democrats throughout the
Johnson Administration was his civil rights policies were in reality,
sectional, rather than national legislation.

That is, Congress was

given the authority to create legislation for the welfare of the nation
as a whole rather than for specific regions.

Representative Gillis

Long (D-La.) argued on 10 February 1964 that the Civil Rights bill has
as its intention to focus mainly on the South. Since the Civil Rights
Commission would be given authority to analyze voter registration in
areas it believed widespread discrimination occurred, Long argued the
South would be the major target for Federal investigations because of
its past record on racial issues.

Thus, the bill which is to

effectively deal with racial discrimination, would actually cause more
discrimination by concentrating its

implementation efforts on the

South rather than on other regions of the country.
bill

II

Long stated the

is obviously to be used as a weapon against areas of some
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Southern States which the [Civil] Rights Commission has said in the
past have a low ratio of Negro voters compared to the size of the Negro
population" (Congressional Record, 1964b, 2759).
Senator James Eastland (D-Miss.) argued this sectional bill would
actually backfire and adversely affect the rest of the nation apart
from the South. Eastland referred to the proposed Civil Rights bill as
a "hydraheaded monster" since he believed if passed, the bill would
lead to serious consequences of racial strife. According to Eastland,
the rest of the nation outside of the South would not be immune from
racial disturbances since no law could be devised to significantly deal
with America's race problem (Congressional Record, 1964a, 14226).
Eastland expressed this outrage when reacting to a substitute bill
proposed by Senators Dirksen (R-Ill.) and Michael Mansfield (D-Mont.)
which was an attempt to redesign the Civil Rights Act that was recently
passed by the House. On 17 June 1964, Eastland argued the proposal
. . . is adroitly and skillfully designed to point a pistol load
ed with live ammunition at the hearts of the Southern States,
while at the same time filling a gun with black ammunition to be
shot in the direction of most of the States in the Union outside
the South (Congressional Record, 1964a, 14227).
Eastland's concern of future rioting in American cities is credible
since the nation was to be confronted with this problem beginning
primarily in 1966 and 1967. The political impact of such riots on the
Johnson Administration will be discussed in chapter four.
Although the South ranked behind the rest of the nation in the
progress of civil rights, it cannot be ignored that the South was
indeed the major cause for the development of the Civil Rights Act of
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1964. Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga.) who led the Southern Democratic
opposition in the Senate, however, argued in an extreme matter as to
portray himself as a States' righter such as those during the period of
Jacksonian politics.

According to Russell, Southern whites, not

African Americans, were the minority in the United States who have been
the most poorly treated by both the Federal government and the rest of
the nation. Even though the South was a minority, the proposed Civil
Rights bill of 1964 would be ignoring the fact that all minorities
under the American political system could exercise certain rights as
well as have them protected by the government (Congressional Record,
1964a 14301). This argument lends itself to the question as to whether
the Federal government overstep the power of the States by passing the
Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Southern Democrats believed this was the

case.
The Future of American Federalism
Senator James William Fulbright (D-Ark.) was one of the Southern
Democrats whose voting record in the Senate during the 1960's opposed
the Johnson Administration.

Fulbright personally began to believe

African Americans did need governmental aid to protect their basic
civil rights. However, issues of achieving racial integration in the
South would need to occur slowly over a period of time.

Ironically,

according to Fulbright, the decision to deal with racial problems was
to be left to the discretion of the States (Woods, 1995, 331-32).
Although this argument appears to be a bit extreme, the general feeling
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among Southern Democrats was the Civil Rights bill would severely
disrupt the equilibrium of power between the Federal and State
governments. Representative John Williams (D-Miss.) maintained States
were losing some of their political power to the Federal government.
Williams argued that original limitations placed on Federal authority
were eroding to the point the Federal government was beginning to have
some political leverage over the States. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
would be one more attribute which would benefit the power of the
Federal government. Thus, the nation had pulled away from the ideas of
the Framers of the Constitution regarding the issue of supremacy (Con
gressional Record, 1964b, 2785).
Richard Russell (D-Ga.) further clarified Williams' argument by
specifically stating how the Federal government was increasing its
political authority over the States.

If passed, the bill would be

giving significant policing powers to the United States Attorney
General to implement the legislation. Because of this, Russell further
contended that this would disrupt ( or at least further damage) the
balance of power between the president and Congress.

Thus, the

proposed bill was not only unconstitutional because it violated States'
rights but it also was eroding the system of "checks and balances"
between the executive and legislative branches (Congressional Record,
1964a, 14300). Russell's argument in a broad sense runs counter to the
overall arguments advocated by Calhoun supporters of States' rights.
That is, although Russell believed the Federal government was intruding
on State authority, he still upheld the basic principles of a Federal
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government unlike the "Calhounites" who eventually began to advocate
secession as an alternative once the idea of nullification failed.
This is one major difference between supporters of the States' rights
movement under John C. Calhoun and supporters of the movement during
the 1960's.

Specifically, the States' rights movement in the 1960's

did not pose a severe threat to the American Federal System.
Overall, Southern Democrats were concerned that the Civil Rights
bill would unnecessarily strengthen the Executive Branch, thus causing
an imbalance among the three branches of government.

Representative

James Haley (D-Fla.) argued before the House on 10 February 1964 that
passage of the bill would provide the office of the presidency with
"dictatorial powers" which would be an assault on the Constitution.
The reason being is it would allow the Attorney General to have a
larger role in its implementation.

Haley criticized the proposed

legislation for providing a "quick fix" regarding black civil rights.
According to Haley, this bill would not effectively promote black civil
rights nor would it attempt to overcome racism. (Congressional Record,
1964b, 2723).

Senator George Smathers (D-Fla.) reiterated Florida's

stand on the bill by stating the legislation ". . . clenches the heavy
hand of the Federal Government into a fist; crushes the dual system of
Federal-State division of powers; and seeks to impose absolute equality
among men, when, in fact, there is no such thing" (Congressional
Record, 1964a, 14445).

It is ironic that Southern Democrats felt the

Federal government was suppressing the rights of States when in fact,
some States continued to suppress the rights of their black citizens.
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The general consensus among many Southern Democrats was that since the
First Reconstruction, their States were more progressive than even the
North in promoting the rights of African Americans.

Therefore, they

believed such legislation advocated by the Johnson Administration would
only inflame racial unrest and obstruct the progress made by the South
in race relations.
The major problem with the arguments made by Southern Democrats
was the rest of the nation as well as Lyndon Johnson were no longer
willing to accept them as rational grounds for stalling the improvement
of black civil rights. Southern Democrats ignored this and continued
to advocate their disgust with the civil rights policies.

However,

they agreed to comply with the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 because they believed Johnson would be satisfied with one
comprehensive bill on civil rights and would move on to other policy
issues in his Great Society program.

Tables 1,2, 3 and 4 on the

following pages provide Southern and non Southern congressional votes
on the House and Senate versions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
party. In the House, 89.58% of all Southern Democratic Representatives
voted against the 1964 Act, while 95.24% of Southern Democrats in the
Senate voted against the bill's passage.

In contrast, 89.51% of

Democratic Representatives who represented regions outside of the South
voted for the bill, while 97.78% in the Senate were supportive of the
legislation.

The Southern Democrats and Republicans were the most

opposed to Johnson's civil rights legislation demonstrating broad
Southern unity regarding civil rights policies.
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Table 1
House Democratic Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1964
(HR 7152)

Region
South
Non South

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

93

7

7.29

86

89.58

155

145

89.51

10

6.17

*Three Southern and seven non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 20, 606-7.

(1965).

88th Cong., 2d

Table 2
House Republican Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1964
(HR 7152)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

10

0

0.00

10

100.00

163

138

82.63

24

14.37

Non South

*Five non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 20, 606-7.

(1965).

88th Cong., 2d
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Table 3
Senate Democratic Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1964
(HR 7152)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

21

1

5.00

20

95.24

Non South

45

44

97.78

1

2.22

Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 20, 696.

(1965). 88th Cong., 2d

Table 4
Senate Republican Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1964
(HR 7152)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

1

0

0.00

1

100.00

33

28

84.85

5

15.15

Non South

Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1965). 88th Cong, 2d sess.
Vol. 20, 696.
Unfortunately for Southern Democrats, this legislation was only
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a prelude to Johnson's civil rights policies which would eventually
lead to many opposing both the Johnson Administration and the
Democratic party in general.

The beginning of the decline of

"Johnsonian" support from the Southern Democrats was seen in the
presidential election of 1964 whereby the Democratic South began to
"experiment" with the Republican party.
Southern Politics and the 1964 Election
The presidential election of 1964 proved to be a milestone in
Southern

politics

since

it

marked

a

period

after

the

First

Reconstruction whereby Southern States began to shift their vote for
Republicans who sought the Oval Office.

In this election, Republican

presidential candidate Senator Barry M. Goldwater (R-Ariz.) won the
support of ".

. the five states of the Deep South--Mississippi,

Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. . . " (Rae, 1994, 42).
Goldwater's success in the South was in part to his opposition to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Senator Goldwater argued the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964
violated States' rights as enunciated in the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution.

Furthermore, Goldwater reasoned that the States and

local communities would be better equipped in successfully promoting
black civil rights than the Federal government.

Because of this,

Goldwater was accused by the Democratic party as representing the view
of Southern Democrats regarding civil rights (Goldwater, 1988, 172).
It should be noted that Goldwater has contended that the media was the
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major force for wrongfully charging that he was a strong advocate
against civil rights policies.
proposed bill
Specifically,

in

1964

Goldwater had voted against the

but supported

nine of

its

provisions.

he reasoned Titles II and VII of the Act were

unconstitutional.

Goldwater argued he did not support the overall

legislation since ". . . it contained 'no constitutional basis for the
exercise of Federal regulatory authority' in the areas of employment
and public accommodations" (Goldwater, 1988, 193-94).

The fact re

mained, however, that Goldwater's vote on the bill was appealing to the
"Solid" Democratic South and was a significant factor for his success
in the 1964 general election.

Prior to supporting the Goldwater campaign, Southern Democrats
were attentive to the efforts of Alabama's Governor George Wallace to
become a presidential contender.

During the 1964 presidential

campaign, Southern Senators were pleased with Wallace's support from
Northern states in the primaries.

For example, "Wallace won 29. 8

percent of Indiana's Democratic presidential primary votes, and on May
19 [1964) he carried over 42. 7 percent of the Democratic vote in
Maryland" (Stern, 1992, 179).

Southern Senators believed if Wallace

continued to receive such support, it would help their opposition to
the proposed Civil Rights bill in 1964.

Wallace's success in the

polls, however, did not "kill" the proposed bill but his support did
demonstrate that Johnson's future civil rights policies would indeed be
met with continued resistance, especially from Southern Democrats
(Stern, 1992, 179). Shortly after the Republican party nominated Barry
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Goldwater as its presidential candidate, Wallace ended his bid for the
presidency and supported Goldwater (Stern, 1992, 195). Perhaps Wallace
realized that in order to retain some of their authority in politics,
Southern Democrats needed to look outside of the Democratic party and
seek another party for support. Since Southern Democrats have appeared
to be conservative on issues of race and the economy, the Republican
party was the next best alternative.
As it became clear that Johnson and Goldwater would be the major
contenders for the presidency in 1964, both developed a "Southern
strategy" in order to win the support of the South. Johnson's Southern
strategy was also developed to maintain his fragile support with many
Southern Democrats. Johnson's plan consisted of four elements to seek
such support.

First was the necessity for Johnson to encourage

Southern blacks to vote Democratically in the election.

Johnson

reasoned many blacks would not vote for Barry Goldwater because of his
vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Furthermore, on 2 August 1964,
the Southern Regional Council reported that certain areas in the
Peripheral South had sizable numbers of blacks who were registered to
vote than in other States that made up the Deep South.

In some

Southern States just outside of the Deep South, " . . • the proportion
of Negroes registered varied from 27.7 per cent in Virginia to 67.2 per
cent in Tennessee. In the Deep South, the proportions varied between
6.7 per cent in Mississippi and 39.1 per cent in Georgia" (Kessel,
1968, 232).

The second and third elements of Johnson's strategy was

the so-called "Lady Bird Special" whereby Johnson's wife Lady Bird
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toured Southern States to gain support from Democrats as well as from
Southern Democratic governors.

The fourth component executed by

Johnson was to include in his campaign rhetoric the need to expand the
strength of the Southern economy (Kessel, 1968, 233-34).

Despite

Johnson's efforts to seek Southern support in his campaign, the major
issue which politically hurt him in the South was his civil rights
policies.
Goldwater understood the importance of the race issue in the
South when devising his "Southern strategy." During the 1960's, it was
Goldwater not Johnson who became a pivotal figure in developing the
"Southern strategy" which would shape future elections. Goldwater and
the Republican party sought support from Southern white Democrats who
advocated the Democratic party had alienated them because of its strong
support of black civil rights. One technique used by Goldwater to win
their support consisted of advocating to the South that the Federal
government had superseded the Constitution in its exercise of authority
to deal with the civil rights problem (Goldfield, 1990, 195-6). This
strategy was needed in order to rekindle Southern anger toward black
civil rights and was shown to be a successful election ploy.
Decline in Southern Democratic Support
Even though Johnson won the presidentiai election of 1964 by a
landslide, Southern voting posed a potential problem regarding future
elections and the Democratic party.

Following the election, the

Southern Regional Council assessed this risk and noted that during the
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election, Johnson was unable to win states in the Deep South ". . .
'with less than 45 percent of [age] eligible Negroes registered'"
(Stern, 1992, 214).

Johnson viewed this as a major problem and

attempted to effectively pursue it by strongly encouraging Congress to
move beyond the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and pass a comprehensive
voting rights bill. Although much of the South eventually succumbed to
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the election of 1964
demonstrated that Southern Democrats had not fully conceded their power
of obstruction on racial issues to Johnson's Democratic party.

Table

5 provides the electoral votes cast by Southern States in the 1964
presidential election.

In this election, Republican candidate Barry

Goldwater dominated the votes from the Deep South indicating this
region was reassessing their support of the Johnson Administration.
The total number of electoral votes Johnson received from the South was
eighty-one while Goldwater obtained forty-seven.
Table 5
Southern Electoral Votes in the 1964 Presidential Election

State

Johnson(D)
Vote

Goldwater(R)
Vote

Alabama

0

10

Arkansas

6

0

Florida

14

0

Georgia

0

12
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Table 5--Continued
Johnson(D)
Vote

State

Goldwater(R)
Vote

Louisiana

0

10

Mississippi

0

7

North Carolina

13

0

South Carolina

0

8

Tennessee

11

0

Texas

25

0

Virginia

12

0

Source:

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 403.

Despite initial warnings of declining Southern Democratic support,
Johnson pushed on to securing passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
It is this legislation along with the American commitment in Vietnam
which would significantly disrupt much of Johnson's support from
Southern Democrats.

CHAPTER IV
THE "SECOND RECONSTRUCTION"
If the South was angry at the passage .of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it was infuriated with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (P.L. 89110, 79 Stat. 437). Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the period referred to by historians as the "Second Reconstruc
tion" began in American politics. The "First Reconstruction" immedi
ately following the Civil War was developed by a Congress consisting of
Northern Republicans since the South was not immediately received into
Southern States were required to accept Reconstruction

the Union.

policies before being allowed to re-enter the Union as a State. Unlike
the Reconstruction after the Civil War, the "Second Reconstruction" was
marked by a Congress whereby the South was fully represented when de
liberations on Johnson's civil rights policies occurred. This Recon
struction period had the potential of being more successful in ensuring
black civil rights since Southern members of Congress had the opportun
ity to vent their opposition and fears concerning such legislation. In
addition, they could also vote on such bills (Lawson, 1976, 340).
Historian Howard Rabinowitz further defined the "Second Reconstruction"
by stating

11 •

•

•

there is a world of difference between the call for

equal opportunity that dominated the First Reconstruction and the
demand for equality of condition which threatened to control the
Second" (Goldfield, 1990, 167-8).
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Led by Dr. Martin Luther, King, Jr. of the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, the Selma march on 7 March 1965 was the major
event in the civil rights movement which caused Congress to discuss a
strong voting rights act. King advocated that a new bill needed to be
passed to fully ensure a black's right to vote. In The Bench and the
Ballot: Southern Federal Judges and Black Voters, Charles V. Hamilton
argued the Selma protests demonstrated that new Federal legislation was
imperative in order to protect black voting rights.

Hamilton stated,

"the Selma protests made it clear that no large number of black people
would be registered quickly as long as the Southern federal courts were
relied on to implement the process" (Hamilton, 1973, 232-3).

There

fore, stronger voting laws than those enunciated in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 were necessary to force many Southern communities to comply
with registering black voters.
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) decided that
Selma, Alabama provided an effective setting for blacks to protest such
rights. Voter registration opportunities for blacks were still rather
limited because potential voters were required to pass discriminatory
voting tests prior to registration for State and local elections. On
average, Selma provided approximately two registration days a month.
Also, as was common in most Southern communities, literacy tests were
the norm in Selma.

Finally and more importantly, Selma's sheriff,

James G. Clark, Jr., was known for his use of brutal force to curb
racial protests carried out by blacks (Davidson and Grafman, 1992, 15).
The idea behind the march was to promote conflict between citizens and
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the law to graphically show the public, through television, that blacks
were still not granted constitutional rights guaranteed to them as well
as were continually assaulted physically by whites.
As the march in Selma began, Alabama's Democratic governor,
George Wallace used force to disband the protesters.

Johnson's im

mediate reaction to the incident was that of apprehension since he was
already pressing for voting rights legislation in Congress.

Any fur

ther attempt to fuel the South's anger over civil rights legislation
might have jeopardized the future passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.

Secondly, Johnson believed strong Federal reaction to the Selma

incident could further fuel support for the States' rights movements in
the South (Kearns, 1976, 228).

As this problem grew in intensity,

Johnson realized that he could no longer remain passive on the issue of
voting rights.
During 1965, Johnson advocated it was imperative to pass a
comprehensive voting rights bill to ensure a citizen's right to vote
guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. Since States, especially in the
South, were not complying with the Amendment, Johnson argued it was his
responsibility as President to enforce the Constitution.

He also

advocated that without a new law, the Federal government lacked the
necessary means to force States to uphold one's constitutional rights
(Public Papers, 1966, 287-8).
On 15 March 1965, Johnson addressed a joint session of Congress
whereby he announced his intentions to send a voting rights bill to
Congress which would end all discriminatory practices used to prevent
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citizens from voting in any election. Johnson justified his actions by
stating "there is no issue of States rights or national rights. There
is only the struggle for human rights" (Public Papers, 1966, 283).
Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the bottom of this page and on the
following pages provide Southern and non Southern voting on the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 in both the House and Senate.

In the House, 67.4%

of all Southern Democrats voted against the voting bill, while 80.00%
of Southern Democratic Senators did not support passage of the
legislation.

In contrast, 97.07% of all House Democrats serving in

States outside of the South voted in favor of the bill, while 93.75% of
them in the Senate supported the legislation.
Table 6
House Democratic Voting on Voting Rights Act of 1965
(HR 6400)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposition

South

82

22

24.72

60

67.42

200

199

97.07

1

0.49

Non South

*Seven Southern votes and five non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 21, 976-77.

(1966). 89th Cong., 1st

Johnson signed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law on August
6. As a tribute, the bill was signed in the room where Lincoln signed
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his Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 (Cohodas, 1993, 377).
Table 7
House Republican Voting on Voting Rights Act of 1965
(HR 6400)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposition

South

17

1

5.88

16

94.12

119

111

89.52

8

6.45

Non South

*Five non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 21, 976-77.

(1966). 89th Cong., 1st

Table 8
Senate Democratic Voting on Voting Rights Act of 1965
(S 1564)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

20

4

20.00

16

80.00

Non South

46

45

93.75

1

2.08

*Two non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 21, 1063.

(1966). 89th Cong., 1st
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Table 9
Senate Republican Voting on Voting Rights Act of 1965
(S 1564)

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposition

0

0.00

1

50.00

30

100.00

0

0.00

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

South

1

30

Non South

*One Southern vote was unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Almanac.
sess. Vol. 21, 1063.

(1966). 89th Cong., 1st

Significance of the Voting Rights Act of 1965
In his article "The Voting Act as an Intervention Strategy for
Social Change:

Symbolism or Substance'?,

11

Mark H. Jones argued the

Voting Rights Act of 1965 included an "intervention strategy." Jones
explained this Act was an attempt to change American society by setting
it on a new course regarding equal rights for blacks (Foster, 1985,
67).

The Johnson Administration viewed the Act as necessary to

completely end Jim Crow.
The provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were more precise
and better enforced than the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The Act

prohibited the use of literacy tests, poll taxes, and other methods
utilized primarily by the South to prevent blacks from exercising their
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constitutional right to vote at all election levels.

In order to

achieve this, Southern States were to seek prior approval either from
the United States Attorney General or a United States Court of Appeals
when they decided to make changes in their state voting laws (United
States Statutes at Large, 1966, 438-39).

This provision was stated in

Section 5 of the bill and was referred to as "preclearance".

The

purpose of this was to prevent the South from developing new voting
tests as a method to continue preventing blacks from registering to
vote (Ball, Krane, and Lauth, 1982, 16).

The issue of the increased

role of the Attorney General in the registration of black voters in the
South will be discussed later in this chapter.
Section four of the Act states the use of such methods as
literacy tests were banned for a total of five years. Eventually, the
Federal government changed this stipulation by prohibiting the literacy
test until 2002 (Foster, 1985, 67).

The Act also reiterated a

provision of the 1964 Act linking voter eligibility to a sixth-grade
education. The difference was that unlike the Civil Rights Act of 1964
which dealt with Federal elections, the Voting Rights Act of 1965
stated this requirement was also to be applied to State and local
elections (Wolk, 1971, 37-8).

Even though there were some legal

"loopholes" regarding discriminatory tests, the Voting Rights Act of
1965 was a more effective tool in fostering black voter registration.
The problem for the Johnson Administration would be seeking Southern
support for the legislation and keeping Southern Democrats intact
within the Democratic party.
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Voting Rights and the South
"Discrimination" Against the South by the Federal Government
The provisions of the voting bill were aimed mainly at Southern
States

whereby the Federal government became directly involved in

increasing the number of registered voters among blacks.

For example,

the Act called for Federal voting examiners to monitor voter
registration in areas " . . . less than 50 per centum of the persons of
voting age residing therein were registered on November 1, 1964, or
that less than 50 per centum of such persons voted in the presidential
election of November 1964" (United States Statutes at Large, 1966,
438).

The South was a prime target because of its history of voter

discrimination.

Federal examiners that were to be used to oversee

voter registration at designated sites in the South were to be selected
by the Department of Justice and the United States Civil Service
Commission (United States Statutes at Large, 1966, 437).

During the

Johnson Administration, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach endorsed
the Act's attempts to use the Federal government to directly deal with
Southern voting practices.

In The Presidency and Black Civil Rights:

Eisenhower to Nixon ( 1971), Allan Wolk states "Katzenbach said that the
Justice Department 'embarrassed Southerners with facts showing voting
deprivation,' because, he believed, Southerners were not against giving
Negroes the vote, but 'rather the way it was done--taking away states
rights, with this clearly regional legislation" (Wolk, 1971, 60).
One of the strategies of the Johnson Administration was to apply
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this bill to the South to increase the number of potential voters who
would vote for the Democratic party.

This plan grew out of concern

regarding much of the South's support of Republican presidential
candidate Barry Goldwater in the 1964 national election (Carmines and
Stimson, 1989, 49-50).

Johnson realized the Democratic party was

losing support from the Southern White Democrats and needed to seek
African American voters for support.
Steven F. Lawson said in Black Ballots:

Voting Rights in the

South, 1944-1969 (1976) that Johnson was devoted to increasing the
number of black voters in the South.

However, Johnson was quite

apprehensive in encouraging these individuals to take an active role in
Democratic party politics.

His rationale was that ensuring a black's

political right to vote would create a springboard whereby blacks would
be able to secure successfully other civil rights long denied them
(Lawson, 1976, 300).

At the same time, he feared this would cause a

"second" departure among many loyal white Southerners as well as States
who might support the Republican party.

This is exactly what

transpired during the rest of Johnson's Administration. As pointed out
in Nicol Rae's Southern Democrats (1994), the impact of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 led to the end of the traditional Democratic "Solid
South."

Instead, the political stage was set for a competitive two

party system in the South (Rae, 1994, 44).
A second impact of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was to
politically empower blacks.

This posed a threat to the established

Southern political tradition (Bass and Devries, 1976, 11-12).

This
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occurred since African Americans viewed the Democrats as the party of
civil rights.

Therefore, African Americans as a whole in the South

would be much more supportive of the Democratic party in contrast to
the Republicans.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 did significantly

increase the number of black voters and thus was successful in
empowering them as a voting group. A recent study reported by Chandler
Davidson and Bernard Grofman showed that
between 1964 and 1988 the percentage of voting-age blacks regis
tered in the eleven southern states increased from 43.3 percent
to approximately 63.7 percent. Black registrants in the five
Deep South states increased in the same period from 22.5 percent
to about 65.2 percent (Davidson and Grofman, 1992, 43).
The Johnson Administration was met with Southern resistance to
the voting bill's implementation. The Federal government did not send
the needed number of Federal examiners to effectively register blacks
in the South.

Instead,

the Justice Department under Nicholas

Katzenbach advocated that Southern States were to take the initiative
to implement the Act.

It is only when there was a refusal by the

States to register blacks that the Federal government would force
compliance (Lawson, 1976, 333-4).

It appears the Johnson Administra

tion was not attempting to force Federal authority upon the States.
The South, however, believed otherwise.
One of the major reasons for Southern opposition to the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was it directly identified the problem in Southern
States rather than having its provisions affect the entire country as
a whole. Under this Act ". . . the states of Alabama, Alaska, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, twenty-six counties
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in North Carolina, and one county in Arizona were therefore subject to
federal intervention" (Scher, 1992, 301). Thus, the South believed its
region was in turn being discriminated upon by the Federal government.
Senator John Sparkman (D-Ala.) verbally attacked Congress as an
institution that had lost sight of its constitutional responsibilities
by passing such a law. First, Congress was violating the Constitution
since the voting bill was merely an

ex post facto

bill. The reason for

this according to Sparkman was Congress used statistical data from the
1964 presidential election to determine which areas, especially in the
South, had low numbers of registered black voters. Therefore, the bill
was an attempt by Congress to pass immediate legislation which was to
be mainly applied to the South which Congress deemed as "guilty"
regarding race relations. Sparkman stated Congress has gone beyond its
legislative authority since "The bill is designed to punish the South
and the South only.

This is regional and punitive legislation--not

national legislation.

Congress should concern itself with matters on

a national basis" (Congressional Record, 1965b, 11727).
Representative Davis (D-Ga.) argued the proposed voting bill was
devised to punish the South for their past transgressions on racial
matters.

In order for the bill to be much more effective as well as

more acceptable by Southern Democrats, its intentions should be to
provide changes to promote better race relations. Davis also declared
before the House on 9 July 1965 that the increased role of Federal
judges in the District of Columbia superseded the sovereignty of the
States and its citizens. Davis argued this legislation
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. . . 'Balkanizes' Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana. It says to the citizens of those
States, 'you have no right to have your day in court before a
judge whom you elected or even before a judge who was reared in
the same State with you. You must go to a particular jurisdic
tion many miles away from your home if you desire your day in
court' (Congressional Record, 1965a, 16212).
The South not only believed it was being discriminated against as a
region but that its people were also being treated unfairly by the
Federal government.
Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) referred to the attempts by
Southern Democrats to argue their region was being punished by the
Federal government for past racial "sins." Javits said on 26 May 1965,
II

that argument impliedly admits that there are sins and

deprivations of voting, as indeed there have been" (Congressional
Record, 1965b, 11741).
Representative Sidney R. Yates (D-111.) argued that the South was
quite guilty of continually curbing the rights of blacks especially
with respect to voting rights. Yates argued before the House on 9 July
1965 that ". . . because of their [Southern blacks] inability to
participate in the basic processes of democracy, they have been
confined to second-class citizenship" (Congressional Record, 1965a,
16229). On that same day in the Senate, Richard Dean McCarthy (D-N.Y.)
pinpointed the two elements which the Federal government needed to
eradicate in the South--the poll tax and all forms of literacy tests.
McCarthy argued that as long as these two practices existed, blacks
would be unable to exercise their Constitutional rights stated in the
Fifteenth Amendment (Congressional Record, 1965a, 16220).
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Unlike the period following the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the South was unwilling to peacefully accept this voting
legislation. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was instrumental in ending
discriminatory techniques to prevent many blacks from voting, but it
did not completely cure racism in the South. Immediately following its
passage, Southern States developed new methods to prevent large numbers
of blacks from being elected to political office. The idea of Southern
politicians was to create political leverage to control black voting.
Some of the more common methods were the redrawing of districts in an
effort to garner greater political support for white candidates running
for office while making it difficult for blacks to meet necessary
requirements when attempting to place their names on ballots.

The

State that led the South in promoting new forms of discrimination was
Mississippi (Parker, 1990, 1).

Although the 1965 Act did increase the

number of registered voters among Southern blacks, African Americans
still had a difficult time in winning various state, local, and Federal
elections. In Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi
after 1965 (1990), Frank R. Parker termed this period after the bill's
passage as the "realization gap." (Parker, 1990, 30).

Parker used

Mississippi as an example by stating
in the first statewide elections after the Voting Rights Act be
came law, held in 1967, despite the fact that blacks had popula
tion majorities in 28 counties and that black voters constituted
twenty-eight percent of the statewide electorate, they were suc
cessful in electing only 22 black candidates to office. By 1968,
taking into account the 1967 elections, school board elections,
and other off-year elections, there were only 29 black elected
officials in the entire state, or only 0.6 percent of the total
number of elected officials (Parker, 1990, 31).
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The role of the South in elections will be further discussed in Chapter
V.

As public opinion of Johnson's exercise of power in his Vietnam

policies turned sour, the South decided to capitalize by publicly
arguing the Johnson civil rights policies were a mere attempt to
increase Federal authority.

These, according to Southern Democrats

were dangerous to the livelihood of democratic principles.
The Southern States' Cry For Limited Role of Federal Authority
The most extreme criticism of the proposed voting bill in the
House came from Representative Jack Edwards (R-Ala.). Edwards compared
the passage of this bill with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the National
Socialist party in German politics during the 1930's and 1940's.
Edwards stated that activity in Germany's government at this time was
a period whereby the executive branch was increasing its political
power over the legislative branch.

According to Edwards, the United

States Congress in 1965 would be giving significant power to the
Executive Branch regarding their handling of race relations in the
South if it passed the voting bill (Congressional Record, 1965a,
16279).

Even though Edwards' assumption was inaccurate, the South

believed the Federal government was significantly increasing its
authority which threatened the ability of the States to govern. There
were two basic arguments made by Southern Democrats in Congress
concerning the issue of Federal authority.
was superseding State authority.

First, Federal authority

Second, the Executive Branch by way

of the Justice Department was showing signs of increasing its exercise
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of power over Congress which would upset the balance among the
separation of powers.
The major problem regarding federalism for Southern Democrats was
the issue of changing election laws. Prior to the voting bill, States
had significant control over the registration of black voters.
led to the increased use of discriminatory tests.

This

The Johnson

Administration's passage of the Act put the registration process under
close scrutiny of the Federal government which was an institution
removed from the local white politics of the South (Fairclough, 1995,
312-13).
States that wanted to change their voting laws were first
required to have them reviewed by a Federal court in the District of
Columbia consisting of a panel of three judges.

Thus, only Federal

judges in Washington D.C., not those serving in the States, determined
the fate of new election laws advocated by the State governments. The
Justice Department under Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
claimed this was necessary to establish a system of uniformity in the
nation regarding the acceptance of new laws. Katzenbach argued that by
only utilizing Federal judges in the District of Columbia, it was not
an attempt by Johnson to exert political leverage over the South by
curbing the power of Southern Federal judges (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, 1965, 540).

Southern Democrats disagreed and felt their

States' rights to govern themselves were in peril.

Representative

Horace Kornegay (D-N.C.) summed it up by contending the 1965 voting
legislation was providing the United States Attorney General with a
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veto power to be exercised against State governments (Congressional
Record, 1965a, 16259).
Senator Stennis (D-Miss.) argued the 1965 Act would restrict the
constitutional rights of States since they were given full authority by
the Constitution to regulate elections at the Federal and State level.
Thus,

by allowing the Attorney General to intervene with voter

registration and the nature of election laws in the South, the
Constitution was being violated. Stennis believed the proposed voting
bill should be defeated in the Senate in order to preserve the notion
of federalism whereby those powers not granted to the Federal
government by the Constitution rest with the States (Congressional
Record, 1965b, 11725).
Southern Democrats found that their arguments which centered on
the changing of election laws also dealt with the concept of separation
of powers. Senator Stennis further argued that the bill violated the
separation of powers since the legislation would give significant
legislative authority to the Executive Branch by way of the Attorney
General.

Stennis stated before the Senate on 26 May 1965, "never

before in the history of this Republic has an executive officer of the
Federal Government been given power to either approve or disapprove an
act of a State legislature, but this bill would do so" (Congressional
Record, 1965b, 11726). The Executive Branch was increasing its power
over Congress in its ability to completely destroy the remnants of Jim
Crow.
Southern Democrats, however, understood that they were losing the
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political battle which centered on black civil rights. They reasoned
that they needed to go beyond the confines of Congress to make one last
effort to revive the dying traditional White Southern politics. They
did not have to go far.

The civil rights legislation during the

Johnson Administration not only provided blacks with better civil
rights enforcement, but it also led to greater hostility among both
whites and blacks.

As a result, violence caused in part to rising

racism was the norm during the middle and late 1960s.

This type of

racism referred in part to the frustration held by blacks because of
the slow progress regarding civil rights.

Second, racism flared in

response to black opposition to "white control."

Therefore, at the

local level, black anger and frustration were directed to whites,
especially those who were police officers, who represented to many
blacks the presence of white authority (Bennett, Jr., 1965, 293-94).
White Backlash vs. Black Backlash
It has been debated as to the initial political damage incurred
on the Johnson presidency by both a white and black backlash regarding
civil rights.

One of the greatest problems as discussed throughout

this thesis for the Johnson Administration was the growing intensity of
a backlash within its own party by White Southern Democrats (Milkis,
1993, 199).

These so-called "backlashes" which developed from the

American public demonstrated that growing opposition to the Johnson
civil rights policies were not just limited to the Southern Democrats.
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, opinion

72

polls demonstrated that a majority of Americans supported the racial
policies of the Johnson Administration.

This support for Johnson was

short-lived since dissension among the American public on this issue
rapidly declined following the bill's passage when the infamous Watts
riot broke out on 11 August 1965.

This riot, as would future ones,

demonstrated that black frustration over Johnson's civil rights
policies greatly existed. The problem which would adversely affect the
rest of Johnson's Administration was public perception towards his
civil rights policies would "sour" as an increase in this type of
"black backlash" continued (Edsall, 1991, 48).
As the number of riots gradually increased, The National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly referred to as the Kerner
Commission, was created by Lyndon Johnson in 1967 to analyze the
problems of the race riots.

In general, the Commission asserted that

these riots occurred because ". • . our Nation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white--separate and unequal" (Report of The
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968, 1).
The Kerner Commission pinpointed several elements which led to an
unstable political and social atmosphere which caused increased
rioting. One of the major reasons was the continued existence of white
racism whereby efforts were made in society to segregate blacks from
whites in places of employment and public facilities. This occurred in
response to many whites believing their race was superior to that of
the black race. Furthermore, many blacks came to believe that violence
was the only solution to increasing their political and social status
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in American society.

The result of this was the growth of the Black

Power movement (Report of The National Advisory Commission of Civil
Disorders, 1968, 91-3).

Another major cause of increased rioting

concerned the civil rights policies during the Johnson Administration.
The Kerner Commission stated, "The expectations aroused by the great
judicial and legislative victories of the civil rights movement have
led to frustration, hostility,

and cynicism in the face of the

persistent gap between promise and fulfillment" (Report of The National
Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders, 1968, 92).
One of the significant "trigger mechanisms" responsible for
igniting riots was the local police since many blacks associated
officers of the law with "white power." That is, blacks viewed them as
attempting to protect a white society rather than ensuring equal
protection for whites and blacks (Report of The National Advisory
Commission of Civil Disorders, 1968, 93).
Many whites in all regions of the nation grew weary of the
physical results these riots could potentially yield.
study entitled Crime in America:

In his 1970

Observations on Its Nature, Causes,

Prevention and Control, Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General during
the Johnson Administration, explained riots broke out in the last half
of the 1960's in response to black frustration.

That is, the civil

rights legislation and the rest of the Great Society programs did bring
hope to the nation's poor and black. Instead, many did not experience
the fruits of the legislation which led to even further outrage by the
recipients and culminated in the spread of riots (Clark, 1970, 165).
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A type of backlash also occurred from black leaders of the civil
rights movement, especially from Martin Luther King, Jr.

Although

Johnson and King, Jr. attempted to cooperate in their pursuits of black
rights, they increasingly disagreed as to the types of approaches that
should be used. King supported non-violent methods such as sit-ins and
peaceful demonstrations.

Johnson was apprehensive about these tactics

because he feared they could disturb the peace by further inflicting
anger among whites opposed to his civi 1 rights policies. This could in
turn, politically hurt public support of the overall Johnson Adminis
tration.

Therefore, Johnson supported the use of less direct methods

to achieve racial harmony.

Specifically, he argued that congressional

legislation along with a judicial system committed to promoting black
rights were necessary for a successful White House policy on civil
rights (Divine, 1994, 88).
Martin Luther King,

Jr. argued the Federal government was

partially responsible for the increased growth of frustration among
blacks regarding civil rights.

One of the consequences was the

development of black militant movements such as the rise of "Black
Power" which advocated the government could not be relied upon for
securing full black rights. One of the problems which fueled the Black
Power movement was Johnson's commitment in Vietnam.

Many blacks

believed Johnson made Vietnam more of a priority rather than focusing
on social conditions at home such as with civil rights. There was also
the issue of non-violence vs. violence. Many supporters of Black Power
argued Johnson was hypocritical by sending troops consisting of both

75

blacks and whites to wage war in Vietnam.

At the same time, Johnson

tolerated black movements which utilized non-violence tactics instead
of the more violent groups as the most efficient method to overcoming
racial oppression (Ansbro, 1982, 213-14).
As riots continued to sporadically flare from 1965 until the
final year of the Johnson Administration, it became evident that
Johnson would have an uphill battle in his efforts to win re-election
in 1968. Although he declined to seek a second term as President, the
problems associated with his Administration's civil rights policies did
have an adverse affect on Hubert Humphrey's bid for the White House.
Before completing his term as President and despite growing
opposition to his Administration, Johnson wanted Congress to pass one
more monumental piece of civil rights legislation.

Although he was

successful in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,

the

political damage to his Administration on the issue of race from the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was
irreversible.
this.

The Southern Democrats, themselves, clearly understood

In fact, when one reads the pages of debate in Congressional

Record when Congress deliberated on the 1968 bill, Southern Democrats
did not vehemently argue their opposition to the bill.

Perhaps they

understood the permanent damage Johnson had incurred on his own party.
More importantly, Southern Democrats realized that Southern politics
would be forever changed because of Johnson's civil rights policies.
This change, which would be gradual, would be long-lasting for the
Democratic party.
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Civil Rights Act of 1968
One final piece of civil rights legislation which deserves to be
mentioned is the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-284; 82 STAT. 73),
also referred to as the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which was signed into
law on 11 April 1968. Lyndon Johnson had been attempting to have Con
gress pass a fair housing bill since 1966 but was unsuccessful.

As

Johnson failed in obtaining a bill in that year, the strength of the
Democratic party in Congress was also diminishing. For example, forty
seven seats held by Democrats were lost during the mid-term elections
of 1966. A majority of these seats were strong supporters of Johnson's
civil rights policies and were Northern Democrats (Congressional Quar
terly Almanac, 1968, 153). Johnson, however, ignored the severity of
this loss in Congress.
Johnson again addressed Congress on 15 February 1967 regarding
the need to end housing discrimination for African Americans. In the
latter part of his speech, Johnson referred to this issue along with
the Vietnam war of which 10.2 percent of the American forces were
black.

Johnson stated "the bullets at the battlefront do not

discriminate--but the landlords at home do.

The pack of the Negro

soldier is as heavy as the white soldier's--but the burden his family
at home bears is far heavier. . . " (Public Papers, 1968, 194).

It

would not be until a year later when Johnson could convince Congress to
pass such a bill.
On 5 April 1968, one day following the assassination of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., Johnson strongly encouraged Congress to pass

77

such a bill in memory of the martyred civil rights leader of which they
did (Public Papers, 1970, 497).

Although not as significant as the

Voting Rights Act of 1965, the 1968 Act attempted to deal with two
major issues--fair housing and race riots.
The need for a fair housing bill occurred when more residential
areas in the nation were becoming segregated, thus disrupting efforts
by the Federal government to integrate schools and public accommodations.

That is, many whites moved as more black families set up

permanent residencies in their communities.

Johnson attempted to en

courage Congress to pass legislation promoting fair housing but was
unable to have a bill produced until 1968 since the nation and perhaps
Congress as a whole, was not prepared for such action.

Eventually,

Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1968 which was implemented in
December of 1969.

The problem with the Act was it appeared to be too

broad and contained very little strength regarding its enforcement
(Nieman, 1991, 185-86).

The major thrust of the Act was to prohibit

discrimination in housing either provided by the Federal government or
obtained through Federal financial assistance (United States Statutes
at Large, 1969, 82).

Any forms of housing discrimination were to be

monitored by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (United
States Statutes at Large, 1969, 81).

Secondly, those financial insti

tutions such as banks and insurance companies which provided assistance
for those purchasing homes were not allowed to utilize discriminatory
practices when providing loans (United States Statutes at Large, 1969,
83). Although some forms of discrimination occurred at times, the Act
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was successful in diminishing widespread discrimination in the sale of
housing.
The Act also contained a provision that attempted to prevent
racial rioting which had significantly increased since the summer of
1967.

Individuals initiating a riot could receive a five-year jail

sentence in addition to having a potential fine of ten thousand dollars
(United States Statutes at Large, 1969, 76).
Tables 10, 11, 12, and 13 present Southern and non Southern
voting on the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in the House and Senate. Even
with the last major civil rights legislation to become law under the
Johnson Administration, the South continued to resist civil rights
policies. Of all Southern Democrats serving in the House, 73.49% voted
against the Fair Housing Act, while 89.47% of all Southern Democrats in
the Senate did not approve of the legislation. In contrast, 89.63% of
Democratic House members representing States outside of the South
supported the bill,

while 88.64% of the Non-Southern Democratic

Senators favored the bill. These voting records demonstrated that both
Southern Democrats and Republicans in the House were strongly united in
their opposition to the Fair Housing Act. In the House, 73.91% of all
Southern Republicans voted against the bill.

The Northern Democrats

and Republicans continued to remain supportive of Johnson's civil
rights commitment. This was crucial since without strong support from
the Southern Democrats, Johnson needed the support of the Northern
liberals in order to accomplish his goal of securing passage of the
1968 Act.
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Table 10
House Democratic Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1968
(HR 2516)
Total
Votes

Region
South
Non South

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

78

17

20.48

61

73.49

154

147

89.63

7

4.27

*Five Southern votes and ten non Southern Votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (18 August 1967). 25
(33), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1636-37.

Even though Southern Democrats in Congress appeared to be less vocal
in their opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1968, they did present
one major argument in order to refute the proposed bill. The concept
of one's right to acquire and possess property has been a fundamental
ideal held by Americans since the founding of this nation. According
to Representative Tom Bevill (D-Ala.), this right would be seriously
jeopardized by the passage of the proposed 1968 bill.

Bevill argued

this bill violated the Fourteenth Amendment since American citizens
would not have complete freedom to choose the buyers of their home.
Bevill argued the Federal government had increasingly bowed to the
African Americans who were a minority group rather than supporting the
majority of Americans who were white. Instead, the government actually
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believed that by offering pieces of civil rights legislation from time
to time, it hoped to quiet racial unrest. For Bevill, each new bill on
civil rights would only cause more racial uprising since blacks will
demand further civil rights policies (Congressional Record, 1968,
9553).

In addition, each new civil rights law passed by the Johnson

Administration led to further "uprising" in the Democratic party by the
Southern Democrats.
Table 11
House Republican Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1968
(HR 2516)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

South

23
164

Non South

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

6

26.09

17

73.91

156

94.55

8

4.85

*One non Southern vote was unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (18 August 1967).
25(33), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 163637.

The 1968 Act marked the last major civil rights legislation to be
enacted under the Johnson Administration. However, because of his role
in the Vietnam war, Johnson's presidency was perceived at this time as
a failed presidency.
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Table 12
Senate Democratic Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1968
(HR 2516)
Total
Votes

Region

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

19

2

10.53

17

89.47

Non South

39

39

88.64

0

0.00

*Five Non Southern Votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (15 March 1968). 26
(11), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 572.
Table 13
Senate Republican Voting on Civil Rights Act of 1968
(HR 2516)

Region

Total
Votes

Support
Votes

%Support

Opposition
Votes

%Opposed

South

2

1

33.33

1

33.33

30

28

82.35

2

5.88

Non South

*One Southern vote and four non Southern votes were unaccounted for.
Source:

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (15 March 1968). 26
(11), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 572.
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Presidential Election of 1968
The failure of the Johnson presidency was manifested in the 1968
presidential election whereby Johnson was met with great opposition
across the entire country over both his domestic and foreign policies.
Because of this, Johnson left the political stage by simply not seeking
re-election. A major problem was Southern Democratic opposition toward
Johnson was also directed on Hubert Humphrey who was selected as the
Democratic nominee for president.
As early as 1966, Southern governors were unclear as to whether
Johnson should be nominated again by the Democratic party for the 1968
election.

This issue was first enunciated by Missouri Governor Warren

Hearns who argued that it was Johnson's civil rights platform that
distanced him from Southern Democrats.

Hearns contended that the

Democratic party was no longer unified (Califano, 1991, 177).
Table 14 provides Southern electoral voting during the 1968
presidential election.

The only Southern State to support the

Democratic party at the presidential level was Lyndon Johnson's home
State of Texas. In this election, Humphrey received a total of twenty
five electoral votes from the South while Nixon won fifty-eight.
American Independent party candidate George Wallace received forty-five
electoral votes from that region.
The presidential election of 1968 marked a milestone in Southern
voting since it provided a severe blow to the traditional Democratic
South in party politics.

The rest of the South apart from Texas either

supported Richard Nixon or George Wallace of the American Independent
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Probably most damaging to the Democrats was the fact that the

party.

electoral votes in South Carolina, the leading States' rights advocate,
were cast in favor of Nixon (Strong, 1971, 244).
Table 14
Southern Electoral Vote in the 1968
Presidential Election
Humphrey(D)
Vote

Nixon(R)
Vote

Alabama

0

0

10

Arkansas

0

0

6

Florida

0

14

0

Georgia

0

0

12

Louisiana

0

0

10

Mississippi

0

0

7

North Carolina

0

13

0

South Carolina

0

8

0

Tennessee

0

11

0

25

0

0

0

12

0

State

Texas
Virginia
Source:

Wallace(AIP)

Vote

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Despite the irreparable political relations between Johnson and
the Southern Democrats, the issue that needs some discussion is what
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impact did this have on the role of the South in future elections.

The

following chapter briefly assesses the role of the South in national
elections since the 1960s as well as the impact of the civil rights
legislation of the Johnson Administration on elections since 1968. The
major civil rights laws during the 1960 's not only improved the
political and social status of many African Americans but it also
changed the nature of elections to some degree. Specifically, they led
to an increasingly competitive two-party system in the South.

CHAPTER V
PARTY REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTH:

1964-1994

The civil rights policies of the Johnso� Administration weakened
the "grip" the Solid Democratic South had on Southern elections.

The

long term result was that Southern party realignment occurred.
The term "realignment" has received various definitions from
political scientists.

Aaron Wildavsky and Nelson W. Polsby provide as

one of their definitions that

11•

•

•

'party realignment' is usually

taken to mean a massive change in voter loyalties from one of the major
parties to another" (Polsby and Wildavsky, 1991, 199). The realignment
that occurred in the South in wake of Johnson's civil rights policies
was Southern voters were not completely "tied" to the Democratic party.
Instead, many began to support the Republican party.

This type of

realignment, however, did not result in a "massive change" regarding
electorate loyalty but led to a gradual change that continues to the
present.

The Democratic party appears to win a majority of the

elections in the South, but the Republican party has taken strong root
in the South since the 1960's and has been building a steady coalition
of supporters in that region. This has lead to an increasing number of
Southern Republicans winning elections especially at the Federal level.
James Sundquist explains in Dynamics of the Party System:
Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States
(1983) that Southern realignment first occurred at the national level
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and then proceeded to Southern State and local elections.

One of the

impacts of realignment was the increase in ticket-splitting by Southern
voters at all election levels (Sundquist, 1983, 373).

That is, no

longer could the Democratic party be assured of Solid support from the
South.
In addition to disillusioned Southern Democrats over Johnson's
civil rights policies, Republican ascendancy in the South also occurred
in response to a

"vacuum" that was created by the eventual disinte

gration of the Southern segregationist party headed by George Wallace.
Following the 1968 presidential election, Wallace left his American
Independent party to again become a Democrat. Wallace hoped this move
would help him once again win the governor's seat of Alabama in 1970.
Although the American Independent party still existed, it eventually
became an insignificant party in election outcomes because without
Wallace, it had no charismatic and well-known leader with which to
identify with.

When this occurred, Southern whites who formerly

supported this segregationist party looked for another party.

The

Republican party was at an advantage to gaining such individuals for
support because of the recent strong Democratic support of black civil
rights (Sundquist, 1983, 364).
From 1964 until 1994, Southern Republicans have been increasingly
successful in national elections.

This party _became even stronger in

the 1980s following the presidential electoral successes of Republicans
Ronald Reagan and George Bush.

In response, the Republican party in

the South significantly mobilized to seek new members, especially from
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former Democrats (Grantham, 1988, 191).

There was a short period in

the 1970s whereby Republican support had decreased in the South in
response to the Watergate scandal during the Richard Nixon Adminis
tration.

Democratic candidates throughout the nation capitalized on

the scandal to diminish the support of their Republican opponents
(Lamis, 1990, 31).

This lull period regarding Southern Republican

support lasted only through the Jimmy Carter Administration.
Table 15 on the following pages presents the Southern electoral
vote in presidential elections from 1960 until 1992. Republican growth
in the South since the Johnson Administration was most evident at the
presidential level. In this table, (R) represents Southern support for
the Republican candidate based on the electoral votes cast by each
State. A symbol of (D) represents the Democrats while an (I) refers to
support of an independent presidential candidate.

Although a few

Southern States voted for a Republican presidential candidate in the
1960 election, the number and consistency of Southern States voting for
Republican candidates significantly increased beginning during the
Johnson Administration and continued to the 1992 presidential election.
Since 1964, South Carolina which has historically been the Southern
State most resistant to black civil rights had overwhelmingly supported
Republican presidential candidates. The only exception was in the 1976
election when it supported Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter.
Elections in the United States Congress show that although
Southern Democrats were still successful in maintaining a majority of
the seats, Republicans have been able to gradually win an increased
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number of seats since the Johnson Administration. Tables 16 and 17 on
pages ninety to ninety-two present the increase of Southern support for
Republicans by displaying the number of seats during each election year
that Southern Republicans have won. In the case of the Senate, figures
for the Republicans, Democrats, and independents have been given. The
percentage figures refer to only Southern senators or representatives
serving in Congress and thus, do not reflect the entire composition of
Congress. In the Senate elections, Southern Republican candidates have
been increasingly winning seats.

In 1982, 50. 00% of all Southern

Senate seats were held by Republicans.

Following the 1992 election

year, 54.55% of all Southern Senate seats were controlled by the Re
publican party. In the House of Representatives, Southern Republicans
have been more successful in winning seats following the Johnson
Administration. The greatest victory for Southern Republicans in the
House was in the 1994 election whereby 51.20% of Southern House members
were Republican.
Table 15
Southern State Electoral Vote in Presidential Elections
1960-1992
State

'60

Alabama

'64

'68

' 72

'76

'80

'84

'88

'92

R

I

R

D

R

R

R

R

Arkansas

D

D

I

R

D

R

R

R

D

Florida

R

D

R

R

D

R

R

R

R

89
Table 15--Continued
'60

'64

'68

' 72

'76

'80

'84

'88

'92

Georgia

D

R

I

R

D

D

R

R

D

Louisiana

D

R

I

R

D

R

R

R

D

Mississippi

I

R

I

R

D

R

R

R

R

North Carolina

D

D

R/I2

R

D

R

R

R

R

South Carolina

D

R

R

R

D

R

R

R

R

Tennessee

R

D

R

R

D

R

R

R

D

Texas

D

D

D

R

D

R

R

R

R

Virginia

R

D

R

R

R

R

R

R

State

R/I3

1Five electoral votes went to Kennedy while six were cast for an
Independent candidate.

2Twelve of North Carolina's electoral votes were cast for Nixon while
one vote went to George Wallace of the American Independent party.
3virginia

cast eleven electoral votes for Nixon while one vote went
to an Independent candidate.

Source:

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 402-10.

Table 18 provides the gubernatorial election results based on
available seats in the South from 1960 until 1994.

Although the

Democratic party has been rather successful in these races,

the

Republicans begin to sporadically win Southern governorships beginning
in 1966.

In 1960, 1962, and 1964, the Democratic party won all the

Southern governor seats that were up for election that year.
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Table 16
United States Southern Senators by Election Year, Number
of Seats, and Total Percent of Southern Senators
by Party
Independents

Democrats

Republicans

Seats

Percent

Year

Seats

Percent

Seats

Percent

1956

0

0.00

22

100.00

0

0.00

1958

0

0.00

22

100.00

0

0.00

1960

0

0.00

22

100.00

0

0.00

1962

1

4.55

21

95.45

0

0.00

1964

2

9.09

20

90.91

0

0.00

1966

3

13.64

19

86.36

0

0.00

1968

4

18.18

18

81.82

0

0.00

1970

5

22.73

16

72.73

1

4.55

1972

7

31.82

14

63.64

1

4.55

1974

6

27.27

15

68.18

1

4.55

1976

5

22.73

16

72.73

1

4.55

1978

6

27.27

15

68.18

1

4.55

1980

10

45.45

11

50.00

1

4.55

1982

11

50.00

11

50.00.

0

0.00

1984

10

45.45

12

54.55

0

0.00

1986

6

27.27

16

72.73

0

0.00

1988

7

31.82

15

68.18

0

0.00
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Table 16--Continued
Independents

Democrats

Republicans

Seats

Percent

Seats

Percent

27.27

16

72.73

0

0.00

7

31.82

15

68.18

0

0.00

12

54.55

10

45.45

0

0.00

Year

Seats

1990

6

1992
1994

Percent

*Number of Senators in the South=22
Source:

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 815-43.
Table 17
Southern Republican Representatives in the
United States House by Year, Number of
Republican Seats Held, Percent of
Southern Republican Senators, and
Total Southern House Seats

Year

Republican
Seats

Republican
Percent

Total Southern
Seats

1956

8

7.55

106

1958

8

7.55

106

1960

7

6.60

106

1962

11

10.38

106

1964

18

16.98

106
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Table 17--Continued

Year

Republican
Seats

Republican
Percent

Total Southern
Seats

1966

23

21.70

106

1968

26

24.53

106

1970

27

25.47

106

1972

34

31.48

108

1974

27

25.00

108

1976

27

25.00

108

1978

31

28.70

108

1980

39

36.11

108

1982

34

29.31

116

1984

43

37.07

116

1986

39

33.62

116

1988

39

33.62

116

1990

39

33.62

116

1992

48

38.40

125

1994

64

51.20

125

Sources:

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 92124.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (12 November 1994),
52(44). Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 32993300.
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Table 18
Southern Gubernatorial Elections by Year, Number of Available
Seats, Percent Won by Party and Total Elected
1960-1994
Republican

Total Elected

Democrat
Seats

Year

Seats

Percent

1960

0

0.00

5

100.00

5

1962

0

0.00

6

100.00

6

1964

0

0.00

5

100.00

5

1966

2

28.57

5

71.43

7

1968

1

25.00

3

75.00

4

1970

1

14.29

6

85.71

7

1972

1

25.00

3

75.00

4

1974

1

14.29

6

85.71

7

1976

0

0.00

2

100.00

2

1978

2

28.57

5

71.43

7

1980

1

50.00

1

50.00

2

1982

1

14.29

6

85.71

7

1984

1

50.00

1

50.00

2

1986

4

57.14

3

42.86

7

1988

1

100.00

0

0.00

1

1990

2

28.57

5

71.43

7

1992

0

0.00

1

100.00

1

Percent
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Table 18--Continued
Republican
Year

Seats

1994

4

Democrat

Percent

Seats

57.14

Total Elected

Percent
42.86

3

7

*Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia elected governors in odd years.
Louisiana elected Democratic governors in 1975, 1983, and in 1991. In
1979, that State elected a Republican. Mississippi elected Democratic
governors in 1963; 1967; 1971; 1975; 1979; 1983, and 1987. The State
elected a Republican governor in 1991. Virginia elected Democratic
governors in 1961; 1965; 1981; 1985, and 1989. The State elected
Republican governors in 1969; 1973; 1977, and 1993.
Sources:

Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994).
(3rd ed.). Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 667713.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (12 November 1994),
52(44), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.,
3250.

A significant impact of the realignment was both an increased
number of black voters in the electorate as well as some African
Americans being elected to government positions as a result of the
Voting Rights Act of 1964.

Significant numbers of Southern blacks

viewed the Democratic party as the only party which would continue to
ensure their rights and thus, became strong supporters of that party.
In

his

article

"Realignment:

New

Party

Coalitions

and

the

Nationalization of the South" (1987), John R. Petrocik believes
realignment can also refer to

". . . transformations of the social
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group profile of party supporters" (Petrocik, 1987, 352).

As stated

earlier, the Democratic party in the South went through a change since
the 1960s whereby an increasing number of traditional white supporters
became disillusioned with it.

At the same time, those whites who

"exited" the Democratic party by supporting Republican candidates were
being replaced with new black voters. Not only have large numbers of
blacks registered to vote,

but more Southern whites have also

registered to perhaps, prevent black voters from "controlling" the once
white electorate (Grantham, 1988, 195). Grantham Dewey points out in
The Life & Death of the Solid South:

A Political History (1988) that

a "new" Democratic party emerged which was marked by these large
numbers of black supporters (Grantham, 1988, 192).
Since the 1960s, an increasing number of blacks have been elected
at the Federal, State, and local levels in the South which, in the eyes
of Southern Democratic whites, has further eroded the Solid Democratic
South.

This is also partially responsible for causing the growth of

the Republican party in that region.

From 1970 until 1993,

two

hundred and seventy-eight Southern blacks have either been elected to
the United States Congress or won seats in their State legislatures.
At the local level, four thousand, six hundred and forty-six have been
elected to various posts.

This demonstrates that growth among black

governmental officials have been strongest at the local level. During
these years, of all the black elected officials from the South, 5.65%
served at the Federal and State level while 94.35% of them served at
the local level. The greatest growth of black governmental officials
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has occurred in the Deep South whereby Johnson's civil rights policies
were predominately aimed. Of all the Southern black officials, 62.37%
are from the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina) while only 37.43% reside in the Peripheral South (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1994, 284).
At the national level, seventeen Southern blacks held seats in
the United States Congress following the 1994 elections. All of these
black representatives were members of the Democratic party. The Senate
contained no Southern blacks (Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 12
November, 1994a,

10).

This is yet another indication that the

political control of the South by white Southern Democrats has been
diminished.
Lyndon Johnson may have damaged his political support from
Southern Democrats, but he also helped to realign the Southern party
system into one that was not fully dominated by the Solid Democratic
South.

Because of his civil rights legislation, Johnson gave the

Republican party the chance to compete with Southern Democrats in
elections.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
Lyndon Johnson's decision to place the power of the presidency
behind a drive for civil rights of African Americans initiated momentum
which eventually resulted in a substantial party realignment in the
South.

Approximately one hundred years following the Civil War the

strongest civil rights measures to be developed were done so under a
Southern President. This further inflamed those Southern Democrats who
remained completely opposed to black civil rights.

Many Southern

Democrats in the 1960 1 s continued to strongly adhere to States' rights
in an effort to resist Johnson's efforts to increase Federal authority
to deal with black equality.

A major problem for the Johnson

Administration was Southern history had been deeply rooted in the
advocation of States' rights which was strongly articulated by John C.
Calhoun and other Southerners beginning in the late 1820's. Calhoun's
defense of a "concurrent" majority system and state interposition were
the "vehicles" used by the South to defend such rights.

Southern

Democrats who argued for States' rights during the 1960 1 s reflected
these views of former "Calhounites" but they possessed one striking
characteristic.

Although the South in the 1960 1 s and beyond did not

secede from the Union, many Southern Democrats "seceded" from the
Democratic party by increasingly supporting the Republican party.
Despite his Southern heritage, Johnson was determined to force
97
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his Southern Democratic colleagues to either support his civil rights
policies or move out of the way of his attempts to significantly weaken
the "grip" of Jim Crow.

Scholarly works as well as primary source

material on Johnson's commitment to civil rights at times suggest that
Johnson was working from altruistic goals.

This may appear to run

counter to a general perception of Johnson as a politician who is
driven by and for political power.

However, Johnson's underlying

motivations in the area of civil rights will remain unknown despite
what other biographers write.
In the end, many Southern Democrats believed Johnson went too far
with his civil rights policies and began to become disillusioned with
the Democratic party.

The problem they posed for the Johnson Admin

istration was they were unwilling to have their traditional Southern
Democratic politics disrupted by the Democratic party itself.

As

President, Johnson also needed to garner support from Democrats outside
of the South such as from Northern liberals who increasingly supported
civil rights policies in order to maintain some sort of unity within
the Democratic party.

As was seen with congressional voting records

on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, a majority of Johnson's political support
came from Democrats outside of the South.

The price Johnson paid was

he became politically isolat�d from the region.he once represented in
the United States Senate.
While the Vietnam war would prove to be an immediate destructive
liability to Johnson's Administration as well as to Democratic hopes to
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holding onto the White House following the 1968 presidential election,
Johnson's civil rights policies had a long-lasting affect on the
Democratic party in the South.

Even though the Democratic party has

remained competitive in Southern elections at the Federal, State and
local levels,
weakened.

the Solid Democratic South has been significantly

Since the Johnson Administration, the Republican party has

continued to win some Southern elections of which they have been most
successful at the Federal level. While Johnson was concerned about re
election and Southern electoral support, he was not troubled by party
realignment in the South.

Instead, he advocated that American society

was ready for a leader to vigorously pursue civil rights for African
Americans.

Therefore, Johnson opted for the national interest by

devoting a significant amount of his Administration's efforts to
providing further black equality.
As the nation approaches the 1996 presidential election, the
issue of black civil rights is still important and will be addressed,
but it is no longer the defining issue which will cause a sharp
division in the Democratic party at the electorate.

Southern elec

tions, however, will most likely be marked by a competitive "field"
among the two major parties since Southern Democratic victories can no
be longer guaranteed.

Indeed, Johnson's landmark civil rights legis

lation has given the Republican party the chance to compete with
Southern Democrats in elections.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abramowitz, Alan I. (May 1980). Is the Revolt Fading? A Note on
Party Loyalty Among Southern Democratic Congressmen. The Journal
of Politics, 42(2), 568-72.
Ansbro, John J. (1982). Martin Luther King, Jr.:
Mind. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books.

The Making of a

Ball, Howard, Dale Krane, and Thomas P. Lauth. (1982). Compromised
Compliance: Implementation of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Basler, Roy P. (Ed.). (1953). The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln.
New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.
Bass, Jack, and Walter Devries. (1976). The Transformation of
Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since
1945. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
Bennett, Jr., Lerone. (1965). Confrontation:
Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, Inc.

Black and White.

Benton, Thomas Hart. (1903). Thirty Years' View (Vol. 1). New York:
D. Appleton and Company.
Black, Earl, and Merle Black. (1992). The Vital South: How
Presidents Are Elected. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brauer, Carl M. (1977). John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction. New York: Colwnbia University Press.
Brown v. Board of Education.

(1954). 347 U.S. 483.

Brown v. Board of Education. (1955). 349 U.S. 294.
Calhoun, John C. (1851). A Disquisition on Government and a Discourse
on the Constitution and Government of the United States. Colwnbia:
A.S. Johnston.
Califano, Jr., Joseph A. (1991). The Triumph & Tragedy of Lyndon
Johnson: The White House Years. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Carmines, Edward G., and James A. Stimson. (1989). Issue Evolution:
Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
100

101
Castel, Albert, and Scott L. Gibson. (1975). The Yeas and the Nays:
Key Congressional Decisionsi 1774-1945. Kalamazoo: New Issues
Press.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
Civil Rights Cases. (1883). 109 U.S. 3.
Clark, Ramsey. (1970). Crime in America: Observations on Its Naturei
Causesi Prevention and Control. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Cohodas, Nadine. (1993). Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern
Change. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1965). 88th Cong., 2d sess. Vol.
20.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1966). 89th Cong., 1st sess. Vol.
21.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. (1968). 90th Cong., 2d sess. Vol.
24.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (18 August 1967). 25(33),
Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1636-37.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (15 March 1968). 26(11),
Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 572.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (12 November 1994). 52(44),
Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 3201-3312.
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. (12 November 1994), 52(supple
ment to no. 44), Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to U.S. Elections. (1994). (3rd ed.).
Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Congressional Record. (1964). 88th Cong., 2d sess. Vol. 110, pt. 1.
Congressional Record. (1964).

88th Cong., 2d sess. Vol. 110, pt. 2.

Congressional Record. (1964). 88th Cong., 2d sess. Vol. 110, pt. 11.
Congressional Record. (1965). 89th Cong., 1st sess. Vol. 111, pt. 1.

102
Congre ssiona l

Record. (1965). 89th

Congressiona l

Re cord. (1965). 89th

Congre ssio na l

Record. (1968). 90th

12.

Cra lle, Richa rd
the House of
States. New

Cong.,
Cong.,
Cong.,

1st sess. Vol. 111, pt. 9.
1st sess. Vol. 111, pt.
2d sess. Vol. 114, pt. 8.

K. (1854). Spee ches of John C. Calhoun, Delivered in
Representatives, and in the Senate of the United
York: D. Appleton and Company.

Cralle,

Richard K. (Ed.). (1968). The Works of John C. Calhoun (Vol.
1). New York: Russell & Russell. (Original work published 1851).

Richard K. (Ed.). (1968). The Works of John C. Calhoun. (Vol.
6). New York: Russell & Russell. (Original work published 1855).

Cralle,

Da vidso n,

Chandler, and Berna rd Grofman. (Eds.). (1992).
Controver
sies in Minority Voting: The Voting Rights Act in Perspective.
Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Divine , Robe rt
at Home and

A. (Ed.). (1994). The Johnson Yea rs, Volume Three : LBJ
Abroad. La wrence: University Press of Kansas.

Edsall, Thomas Byrne. (1991). Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race,
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics. New York: W. W. Norton &
Company.
Eise nhower, Dwight D. (1965). The White House Yea rs: Waging Peace
1956-1961. Garde n City, N.Y.: Doubleda y & Company, Inc.
Ellis, Richard E. (1987). The Union at Risk: Jacksonia n De mocracy,
States' Rights, and the Nullifica tion Crisis. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Fairclough, Adam. (1995). =Ra=c-=--e�&"-----"De---" =mo=c-"- -=--ra=c-=--y._:'---"T=he= --'C.Ci= v1_ -=--·l"----'-Ri� �g=ht= s=
Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972. Athens: The University of
Georgia Press.
Fea gin, Joe R. (May 1972). Civil Rights Voting by Southern
Congre ssmen.
The Journal of Politics, 34(2), 484-99.
Fisher, Louis. (1990). Constitutional Rights: Civil Rights a nd Civil
Liberties (Vol. 2). New York: McGra w-Hill Publishing Company.
Fone r, Eric. (1988). Reconstruction: America 's Unfinished Revolution
1863-1877. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Foster, Lorn S. (Ed.). (1985).
and Implica tions. Ne w York:

The Voting Rights Act:
Praeger.

Consequences

103
Franklin, John Hope. (1994). Reconstruction After the Civil War (2nd
ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Freehling, William H. (June 1965). Spoilsmen and Interests in the
Thought and Career of John C. Calhoun. The Journal of American
History, 52(1), 25-42.
Freehling, William W. (1990). The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at
Bay 1776-1854 (Vol. 1). New York: Oxford University Press.
Garrettson III, Charles Lloyd. (1993). Hubert H. Humphrey: The
Politics of Joy. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Goldfield, David R. (1990). Black, White, and Southern: Race
Relations and Southern Culture 1940 to the Present. Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Goldwater, Barry M. (1988). Goldwater. New York:
Goodwin, Richard N. (1988). Remembering America:
Sixties. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.

Doubleday.
A Voice From the

Grantham, Dewey W. (1988). The Life & Death of the Solid South: A
Political History. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.
Guinn v. United States. (1915).

238 U.S. 347.

Hamilton, Charles V. (1973). The Bench and the Ballot: Southern
Federal Judges and Black Voters. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Hemphill, W. Edwin, and Clyde N. Wilson. (Eds.). (1977). The Papers
of John C. Calhoun 1825-1829 (Vol. X). Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press.
Johnson, Lyndon Baines. (1971). The Vantage Point: Perspectives of
the Presidency 1963-1969. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Kearns, Doris. (1976).
York: Harper & Row.

Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream. New

Kessel, John H. (1968). The Goldwater Coalition: Republican
Strategies in 1964. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
Key, Jr., V. 0. (1949). Southern Politics in State and Nation. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Lamis, Alexander P. (1990). The Two-Party South. 2nd ed. New York:
Oxford University Press.

104
Lawson, Steven F. (1976). Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the
South, 1944-1969. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lawson, Steven F. (1985). In Pursuit of Power:
and Electoral Politics, 1965-1982. New York:
University Press.

Southern Blacks
Columbia

Matthews, Donald R., and James W. Prothro. (1966). Negroes and the
New Southern Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
McPherson, James M. (1992). Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Recon
struction (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
Meier, August, and Elliott Rudwick. (1976). From Plantation to Ghetto
(3rd ed.). New York: Hill and Wang.
Milkis, Sidney M. (1993). The President and the Parties: The Trans
formation of the American Party System Since the New Deal. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Miller, Merle. (1980). Lyndon: An Oral Biography. New York:
Putnam's Sons.

G.P.

Miroff, Bruce. (1981). Presidential Leverage Over Social Movements:
The Johnson White House and Civil Rights. The Journal of Politics,
43(1), 2-23.
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada. (1938). 305 U.S. 337.
Nieman, Donald G. (1991). Promises to Keep: African-Americans and
the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Niven, John. (1988). John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union: A
Biography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Palmer, Beverly Wilson. (Ed.). 1990. The Selected Letters of Charles
Sumner (Vol. 2). Boston: Northeastern University Press.
Parker, Frank R. (1990). Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in
Mississippi After 1965. Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press.
Peterson, Merrill D. (1987). The Great Triumvirate:
and Calhoun. New York: Oxford University Press.

Webster, Clay,

Petrocik, John R. (1987). Realignment: New Party Coalitions and the
Nationalization of the South. The Journal of Politics, 49(2),
347-75.

105
Plessy v. Ferguson.

(1896). 163 U.S. 537.

Polsby, Nelson W. and Aaron Wildavsky. (1991). Presidential
Elections: Contemporary Strategies of American Electoral
Politics (8th ed.). New York: The Free Press.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy,
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements of the
President, January 1 to November 22, 1963, 1963. (1964).
Washington: United States Government Printing Office.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1963. (1964). Washington: United States
Government Printing Office.
Public Pa ers of the Presidents of the United States: L don B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1963-64. (1965). Book I. Washington: United
States Government Printing Office.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1965. (1966). Book II. Washington: United
States Government Printing Office.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1965. (1966). Book I. Washington: United States
Government Printing Office.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lyndon B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1967. (1968). Book I. Washington: United States
Government Printing Office.
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Lvndon B.
Johnson, Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and Statements
of the President 1968-69. (1970). Book I. Washington: United
States Government Printing Office.
Rae, Nicol C. (1994). Southern Democrats. New York:
University Press.

Oxford

Reedy, George E. (1970). The Twilight of the Presidency. New York:
The World Publishing Company.
Reichley, A. James. (1992). The Life of the Parties: A History of
American Political Parties. New York: The Free Press.

106
Scher, Richard K. (1992). Politics in the New South: Republicanism,
Race, and Leadership in the Twentieth Century. New York: Paragon
House.
Scott v. Sandford. (1857). 19 Howard 393.
Shelley v. Kraemer. (1948). 334 U.S. 1.
Sitkoff, Harvard. (1981). The Struggle for Black Equality 1954-1980.
New York: Hill and Wang.
Smith v. Allwright. (1944). 321 U.S. 649.
Spain, August O. (1968). The Political Theory of John C. Calhoun.
New York: Octagon Books, Inc.
Stampp, Kenneth M. (1965). The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Stern, Mark. (Fall 1991). Lyndon Johnson and Richard Russell: Insti
tutions, Ambitions and Civil Rights. Presidential Studies Quar
terly, 21, 687-704.
Stern, Mark. (1992). Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson, and
Civil Rights. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
Strong, Donald S. (1971). Further Reflections on Southern Politics.
The Journal of Politics, 33(2), 239-56.
Sundquist, James L. (1983). Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment
and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States.
Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Sweatt v. Painter. (1950). 339 U.S. 629.
Sylvia, Ronald D. (Summer 1995). Presidential Decision Making and
Leadership in the Civil Rights Era.
Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 25(3), 391-411.
United States Kerner Commission. (1968). Report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office.
United States Statutes at Large: Containing the Laws and Concurrent
Resolutions Enacted During the Second Session of the Eighty-Eighth
Congress of the United States of America, 1964, and Twenty-Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution and Proclamations. (1965) (Vol 78).
Washington: United States Government Printing Office.

107
United States Statutes at Large: Containing the Laws and Concurrent
Resolutions Enacted During the First Session of the Eighty-Ninth
Congress of the United States of America, 1965, and Reorganization
Plans, Proposed Amendment to the Constitution, and Proclamations.
(1966) (Vol. 79). Washington: United States Government Printing
Office.
United States Statutes at Large: Containing the Laws and Concurrent
Resolutions Enacted During the Second Session of the Ninetieth
Congress of the United States of America, 1968, and Reorganization
Plans and Proclamations. (1969) (Vol. 82). Washington: United
States Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce. (1994). Statistical Abstract of the
United States 1994. Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
Weisbrot, Robert. (1990). Freedom Bound: A History of America's
Civil Rights Movement. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Wicker, Tom. (1968). JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon
Politics. New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc.
Williamson, Joel. (1984). The Crucible of Race: Black-White
Relations in the American South Since Emancipation. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Clyde N. (Ed.). (1978). The Papers of John C. Calhoun 18291832 (Vol. 11). Colwnbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Wilson, Clyde N. (Ed.). (1980). The Papers of John C. Calhoun 18351837 (Vol. 13). Colwnbia: University of South Carolina Press.
Wolk, Allan. (1971). The Presidency and Black Civil Rights:
Eisenhower to Nixon. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University
Press.
Woods, Randall Bennett. (1995). Fulbright:
Cambridge University Press.

A Biography. New York:

Woodward, C. Vann. (1974). The Strange Career of Jim Crow. (3rd ed.).
New York: Oxford University Press.

